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Abstract
The present study is a comparative approach to revolutions and their effect on population
health during the post-conflict period. Specifically, it attempts to determine whether revolutions
that are accompanied by a coup d’état have a significant negative impact on post-revolution
population health. Degree of revolutionary violence, governmental structures, and prerevolution health systems is of particular interest as relevant variables. The study focuses on the
Latin American countries of Nicaragua and Chile due to their similar region and timeframe. The
revolutions and accompanying coup d’état in both of these countries do not demonstrate different
patterns on public health in the post-conflict period; rather, governmental structure and regime
type were found to be more influential on a nation’s post-revolution health status than the
occurrence of a coup d’état. It has also been found that the implementation of effective
programs, community participation, and population expectation are the primary factors that
influence post-revolution health status.

viii

We all want to change the world
But when you talk about destruction
Don't you know that you can count me out?
- John Lennon

Section I: Introduction and Background
Introduction
The traditional scholarly consensus repudiated the use of regime characteristics as a
legitimate method for comparative policy, particularly for healthcare. Since they based their
claim using dichotomies, however, this consensus gradually changed as the body of literature
evolved;1 indeed, a dichotomous categorization of revolutions does not always aptly account for
the complexity of the socioeconomic situation. A combination of regime characteristics,
revolution types, the presence of coups d’état, and relevant health determinants is necessary to
comprehensively analyze the efficacy of healthcare reforms and the health status of postrevolution countries.
Despite the contending definitions of revolution and coup d’état, a general foundation
may be derived from common criteria and processes, which may then be tailored to a country- or
region-specific analysis. The success and severity of revolutionary impact are determined by the
presence of several interactive elements, of which violence is a potentially superfluous attribute,
as well as the degree of resultant sociocultural change. The most acute of scenarios results in a
military dictatorship or authoritarian regime, but a more mild change would simply be the
replacement of governmental personnel. Understanding the severity of revolutionary processes
and tactics will determine its impact on society and thus public health.

1

Thomas John Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis? Or, The State and Health
Policy in Central America,” Comparative Politics 15 (July 1983), 419.
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“Revolution” Terminology and Parameters
Purpose
Understanding revolutionary nature and theory will help to determine the change and
impact on post-revolution public health and health status. However, scholars have described the
study of revolutions to be somewhat nebulous and the study of coups d’état even more nebulous
still. Such an amorphous sociopolitical phenomenon as a revolution cannot be explained with a
rigid and fixed definition; this is not to say that all parameters should be eliminated, but rather
that it should not be the primary debate. What constitutes “revolution” and its impact on social
systems and regimes should be sufficient to at least distinguish between revolutionary
occurrences according to the levels of government, nation, and region.
Although a specific understanding of each revolution will be analyzed in its own right to
determine the specific changes unique to the nation, as “it is the original aspects of a particular
revolution which determine its success or failure,”2 a general theoretical approach illuminates the
shared commonalities among revolutions. The following list of contending definitions, albeit not
exhaustive, provides an interrelated account of revolutionary theory, process, and outcome.
Contending Definitions, Theories, and Varieties of Revolutions
Defining the “Fever” of Society
Chalmers Johnson defines a revolution as a form of social change, which often “involves
the intrusion of violence into civil social relations,” including “peasant jacqueries, urban
insurrections, military coups d’etat, conspiracies plotted by revolutionary associations, and

2

Lawrence Kaplan, introduction to Revolutions: A Comparative Study, ed. Lawrence Kaplan (New York: Vintage
Books, 1973), xv.
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domestically supported counterrevolutions” as either a rebellion or revolution.3 These processes
are intended forms of violent action, organized and planned to initiate societal change, for a “true
revolution is neither lunacy nor crime. It is the acceptance of violence to cause the system to
change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent on this perception
of societal failure.”4 As the purpose of society is to eliminate violence and foster cooperation
among its citizens, violence in the form of revolution indicates a collapse of the social system.5
Based on his set parameters, some societies thus have revolutionary potential and/or
proclivity. Indeed, Socrates asks of Adeimantus in the Republic, “Now, the best things are least
liable to alteration or change, aren’t they? For example, a body is altered by food, drink, and
labors, and all plants by sun, winds, and other similar affections – but the healthiest and strongest
is least altered, isn’t that so?” (Republic, Book II, 381e).6 “Unhealthy” or unstable societies are
those in which revolutions are more likely to occur, and Johnson believes that the comparative
method “must be devoted to comparing potentially revolutionary societies.”7
Although Johnson does not consider rebellions and revolutions as dichotomies, he does
differentiate between the two along a continuum and further divides them into (1) “simple”
rebellions, (2) “simple revolutions,” (3) “total” rebellions, and (4) “total” revolutions. While a
simple rebellion does not have an accompanying ideology and is exemplified by such
occurrences as a jacquerie, a total revolution aims at a total restructure of the society. This
spectrum of varieties corresponds to the various levels of society; for example, “institutionalized
changes” within the government may result in simple rebellions, “fundamental changes” within

3

Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1966), 1; 6-7.
Johnson, 12-14.
5
Johnson, 8-12.
6
Quote translated in Michael L. Morgan, ed., Classics of Moral and Political Theory (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, Inc., 2005).
7
Johnson, 7.
4

3

the regime may lead to ideological rebellions or simple revolutions, and a “change in basic
political consciousness” may lead to total revolutions.8 Earl Conteh-Morgan expands Johnson’s
spectrum to include the (1) Jacquerie (mass or peasant rebellion), (2) Millenarian rebellion
(religious and idealist rebellion), (3) anarchistic rebellion (antinationalistic or Utopian rebellion),
(4) Jacobin communist revolution (“classic revolution”), (5) conspirational coup d’état (an elitist
revolution), and (6) militarized mass insurrection (elitist and nationalistic). He further
differentiates between the rural targets of “traditional monarchies” such as seen in France,
Russia, and China and the urban targets of “modern dictatorships” as seen in Mexico, Cuba,
Nicaragua, Iran, and the Philippines.9
A classification of revolution by their various tactics rather than ideologies is a type of
reductionism and can lead to “widespread confusion over the very meaning of revolution,”
because not all tactics are revolutionary. Johnson warns that the “sources of change” do not
necessarily predict the type of revolution that will occur, and further states that an obsessive
pursuit of such stipulation may result in “excessive abstraction and superficiality;” thus, he
would consider a coup d’état as a tactic that could lead to a revolution rather than a form of
revolution.
Johnson insists that a comparative study of revolutions must also include a comparison of
social systems; otherwise the analysis will lack theoretical consistency.10 In her work concerning
the social revolutions of France, Russia, and China, Theda Skocpol contrasts each country with
(1) “instances of non-social revolutionary modernization” and (2) “instances of abortive social
revolutions.” She controls for variation and compares the cases for phenomena which may be

8

Johnson, 122-127.
Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts
(New York: Routledge, 2003): 163-165.
10
Johnson, 129; 136.
9
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present in one and not the other. In all three cases, she found that there was a tendency for
peasant insurrection and military disorganization.11 Her methods effectively evaluate each case
both in their own context and comparatively to determine any commonalities or differences.
Although “revolution” can be a loose term, Crane Brinton states that the common “core”
definition for revolution in the field of politics is a “drastic, sudden substitution of one group in
charge of the running of a territorial political entity by another group hitherto not running that
government.”12 Similar to Johnson, Brinton abhors absolute precision of definition, for “he [the
scientist] is interested less in beauty and neatness of definition than in having his definitions fit
not his sentiments and aspirations, but the facts.”13 He also distinguishes between the healthy
and unhealthy society, or rather societal equilibrium and disequilibrium. Societies in equilibrium
are stable and have members who respond “predictably to given stimuli;” “as new desires arise,
or as old desires grow stronger in various groups, or as environmental conditions change, and as
institutions fail to change, a relative disequilibrium may arise, and what we call a revolution
break out.”14 Disorder is certainly a universal tendency of all societies at one time or another, for
discontent is an inherent proclivity, but a healthy and generally stable society is one in which
tensions and criticism exist in a tolerable amount.15
The analogy between revolution and disease is deepened, symbolically representing
revolutions as fevers; the old regime preceding the revolution perceives discontent through
“prodromal signs” such as societal restlessness that is not quite the presence of revolution.16 The
disease only becomes present when symptoms arise, indicating that the revolution has begun.
11

Theda Skocpol, “France, Russia, China: A Structural Analysis of Social Revolutions,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 18 (April 1976): 177; 209.
12
Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books), 4.
13
Brinton, 11.
14
Brinton, 15-16.
15
Brinton, 27-28.
16
Brinton, 65.
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Eventually a crisis takes place, which is followed by a period of “convalescence” and perhaps
several relapses. The society, represented as the body, may become stronger from the revolution
or illness in the form of a more effective government.17
Revolutionary Process and Criteria
Peter C. Sederberg provides a repetitive yet necessary account of thirteen contending
definitions of revolution, including those of notable scholars such as Charles Tilly and Samuel P.
Huntington. Despite this range of perspectives, Sederberg states that revolutions share the four
main characteristics of process, duration, direction, and outcome of which process and duration
are the two most disputed elements, and outcome includes the degree of change within regime
personnel, institutional structure, socioeconomic structures, and basic culture.
Each of these elements are weighted differently; Sederberg argues that “no lower-scale
alteration of personnel, structure, or culture is really revolutionary. A shake-up of the class
structure or basic cultural values, in contrast, clearly satisfies the expectation of significant
change.”18 Criteria for a revolutionary process differ among scholars, as some consider outcome
more important or violence as a superfluous trait.19 Some scholars argue that revolutions are
sudden or have a short time span, while others argue that they can be more prolonged; Sederberg
does not discount either perspective, and rather elucidates the possibility that attributing the
quality of suddenness may be due to the revolutionaries’ intention for sudden change, whether it
is realized in actuality or not. Sederberg also states that revolutions are naturally distinguished

17

Brinton, 17. It must be noted that he defines society merely to indicate the collective individual for behavior, and
he is careful to mention that there is a distinction between metaphysics and science in light of the “soul” of
revolution and the body politic.
18
Peter C. Sederberg, Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change (New York: HarperCollins
College Publishers, 1984), 54-57.
19
Sederberg, 57-58. The author also recognizes that nonviolent regimes are of particular interest when considering
revolutionary process. Gene Sharp recognizes that the regime’s method of control or coercion can be ineffective
against the populace who refuses to accept their authority and cease to respond.
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from other social transformations depending on the guided direction and social movements
behind them.20
He concludes with his own definition that a “revolution is a significant change
deliberately wrought over a relatively short time through a strategy involving considerable
coercion,” in which the change brings a revolutionary outcome, the coercion is the revolutionary
strategy, and the strategy is implemented by revolutionaries.21 He states that coercive violence is
an intentional harm that attempts to achieve political significance with “mutual interaction”
among the population. Stable societies tolerate “acceptable force” such as strikes to achieve
predictable control of this interaction, whereas unstable societies harbor “unacceptable violence”
such as revolutions.22
Much like Johnson, Jack A. Goldstone states that “many of the characteristics of
revolutions reflect the conditions of revolutionary struggle per se;” therefore, despite their
different ideologies and backgrounds, revolutions usually follow a general process.23 State
breakdown is caused by a seemingly delicate process and combination of fiscal distress, elite
alienation, and mass mobilization. A drain in the state resources strains the societal balance and
decreases state authority, leading to a potential neopatrimonial state through “borrowing, new
taxes of dubious legality, and simple corruption.” Elite loyalty is tenuous without state bribery
and both the military and bureaucracy become ineffective. If the elite are alienated, then a crisis
in the form of “a war, a collapse of state credit, or superpower pressure” will likely lead to
revolution, for “revolutionary struggles arise only when elites are severely divided – a united
20

Sederberg, 58-61.
Sederberg, 61-62. It must be noted here that the author believes it to be a rare occurrence to have all three factors
of outcome, strategy, and revolutionaries.
22
Sederberg, 38-45. Sederberg’s typologies of violence are organized according to degree, and will be discussed in
more detail under “Revolutionary Spectrum.”
23
Jack A. Goldstone, “An Analytical Framework,” in Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century, ed. Jack A.
Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, and Farrokh Moshiri (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 47.
21
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elite, opposed to a government that is weak in resources, can simply stage a coup d’etat and then
alter government policies.”24 According to Goldstone’s “interactive model,” a revolution will
only occur when these two elements are combined with mass mobilization in the form of
demonstrations or riots. This “revolutionary conjuncture” of the three main factors can be
exacerbated by several elements such as rapid price inflation, population growth, nationalism,
the emergence of “professional groups,” corruption, power concentration, and economic shifts.25
Similar to the other scholars, Goldstone explains that the revolutionary process is
accompanied by a gradual ideological change, which usually begins conservatively. As the state
continues to lose its authority, conservative ideologies transform into radical ideologies,
rendering counterpropaganda ineffective. An ideology must be widely accepted to gain popular
support and radical enough to contend with other competing radical ideologies.26 A highly
organized and conservative coalition successfully forms in order to solve the unavoidable
problems of the state that persist into the post-revolutionary period. They gain the interest and
support of essential groups through the strategies of rectification to address “formal grievances,”
redistribution of private property to address “material grievances,” and nationalism to villainize
enemies in order to unite the population. “Thus, a nationalist policy, involving strong leadership
and action against external ‘enemies,’ is often the key to restoring national unity and order.” 27
Thus, military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes are often welcomed, as they “embod[y] the
fervent nationalism that is the common denominator to which most revolutions are eventually
reduced.”28

24

Goldstone, 38.
Goldstone, 40-42. Johnson also alludes to this theory of “conjunction.”
26
Goldstone, 44.
27
Goldstone, 46-7.
28
Goldstone, 47.
25
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Similar to Sederberg’s distinctions, James DeFronzo differentiates a reform movement,
which “attempts to change limited aspects of a society but does not aim at drastically altering or
replacing major social, economic, or political institutions,” and a revolutionary movement, “in
which participants are organized to alter drastically or replace totally existing social, economic,
or political institutions.”29 Similar to several scholars preceding him, DeFronzo considers
violence as a likely attribute of revolutionary movements and differentiates between the two
types of “people’s war” and “guerrilla warfare.”30
He presents his own “conjunction” approach to understanding revolutions and states that
there are five particular factors necessary for success. “Mass frustration,” which creates popular
uprisings among the population, is a result of “relative deprivation” (or Goldstone’s “injustice”)
caused by increased expectations with decreased standard of living and governmental
capabilities. Also similar to Goldstone are “dissident elite political movements” and “unifying
motivations” such as nationalism. Aligned with Sederberg’s theory, a “severe political crisis”
that impedes the “coercive capabilities of the state” and takes advantage of “a permissive or
tolerant world context” creates the opportunity for a successful revolution. Revolutions are
unsuccessful if the concurrence of all of these five factors does not take place, particularly that
which unifies a population. Indeed, “nationalism, as a spur to unified action, and economic
redistribution, as an antidote to mass frustration, join together with the other major revolutionary
factors…to explain many sociopolitical upheavals of the past and, perhaps, those of the centuries
to come.”31 DeFronzo states that most revolutionary theories share the commonalities of mass
frustration and the inability of the state to deal with rising mass expectations. International

29

James DeFronzo, Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements, 3rd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007), 8.
DeFronzo, 8-9.
31
DeFronzo, 10-11; 18-22; 27.
30
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permissiveness is an additional, albeit less acknowledged, factor that creates an amenable
environment for revolutions.32
Drawing from his scholarly predecessors of revolutionary theory, DeFronzo created an
original revolutionary sequence which begins as an intellectual opposition to the old regime.
The old regime then attempts reforms, but internal conflicts arise from a “revolutionary
alliance.” The moderate post-revolution government that is established soon collapses and gives
way to a wave of radicalism. Radicalism is in turn taken over by extremism and coercion in
order to fulfill the revolution’s goals, and “more pragmatic moderate revolutionaries” eventually
replace them.33 This revolutionary process can also be seen with Brinton’s “accession of the
extremists,” where the legal government, led by the moderates who have established prestige,
financial resources, and institutions, is challenged by their “rival” illegal government run by the
extremists. The moderates prove to be weak and inadequate due to their liabilities and
“virtuous” responsibility to rights, and unwillingly concede to the extremists.34
As with DeFronzo, Conteh-Morgan differentiates between (1) revolutions which attempt
to alter the status quo and (2) riots, violent demonstrations, and civil wars which affect state
integrity. He claims that only “profound” alterations to society truly constitute a revolution,
since they alter the values, structure, institutions, and elite leadership of the society in which it
occurs, whereas coups d’état do not have a lasting effect on the societal structure. Unlike the
previous scholars, Conteh-Morgan is more concerned with a stipulated definition of revolution,
and considers the “perfect revolution” to have the specific attributes of (1) “an overthrow of the
government by its own subjects, carried out from within the state,” (2) “the old ruling power elite
replaced by a new one from within the state,” (3) “mass insurrection, involving violence or the
32

DeFronzo, 25-26.
DeFronzo, 22-23.
34
Brinton, 134.
33
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threat thereof,” and (4) “a transformation of the old social system.”35 Of course, this is not very
different from the “conjunction” theories of Goldstone and DeFronzo.
Revolutionary Spectrum
Degrees of Revolution, Political Change, and Violence
In his work Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change, Sederberg has
included several tables that clearly display the various and complex dimensions of a revolution
and the potential violence that accompanies it. Indeed, “the notions of violence as a means and
revolution as an end of political struggle receive special attention.”36 His compilations are
particularly useful in determining the degree or severity of revolution and revolutionary violence,
which allows for adequate categorization and thus a better foundation for comparative methods
of analysis.
Based on Goldstone’s theories of revolution, Sederberg has composed a comprehensive
table that displays the degree of revolution from stability to total “great revolution,”
corresponding to eight different attributes; the lack of all attributes indicates political stability,
while the presence of all eight attributes indicates a total revolution and political instability. In
line with several of the aforementioned theorists of revolution, the two particular attributes only
present in a total revolution are a change in both the “status systems of traditional elites” and the
“economic organization” of a society, indicating the clear severity and impact of such an
occurrence.37 The author states that “no lower-scale alteration of personnel, structure, or culture
is truly revolutionary. A shake-up of the class structure or basic cultural values, in contrast,

35

Conteh-Morgan, 156-157.
Sederberg, 8.
37
Sederberg, 60-61.
36
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clearly satisfies the expectation of significant change.”38 For Sederberg and several of the
aforementioned scholars, the degree of change is a significant aspect, and determines the degree
of revolution. Somewhat more controversial than degree and severity of revolutionary change is
the presence and degree of violence. Accepting scholarly vacillation concerning violence as a
necessary characteristic, Sederberg does not discount it as a possible significant factor within
some revolutionary occurrences.39

38
39

Sederberg, 55-56.
Sederberg, 47-53.
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Table 1-1: “Crisis, Breakdown, and Revolution: An Inventory of Attributes”40
(1=Attribute present; 0 = Attribute absent)

Elite revolts
against state

0

Popular
revolts
against state
or elites

0

Widespread
violence or
civil war

0

Change in
political
institutions

0

0

Change in
status system
of traditional
elites

0

0

Change in
economic
organization

0

0

Change in
legitimizing
symbols and
beliefs

Attribute

0

0

Widespread
elite/popular
alienation
from state

0

0

13

Type
Stability

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

Successful
repression

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

1

0

1

1

0

1

1

0

Conservative
political
reform
0

1

1

1

0

Dynastic
civil war
1

1

1

1

Secessionist
civil war
1

1

1

Political
revolution

1

Normal coup
d’état

“Great”
revolution

Sederberg, 60.

40

Table 1-2: “Forms of Domestic Violence”41

Variable

Low/Medium

Low

Low

Low/Medium

Low/Medium

Low

Destructiveness

0

Low/Medium

Low

Medium/High

Elite
Participation

Low
~0

Low/Medium

Low

Mass
Participation

Urban and rural
Low/Medium

~0

High

Direction of
Change

1. Violent Crime
Rural

Low/Medium

-1 to 0

Political
Significance

2. Social banditry

Urban

Medium

Medium/High

Location

3. Gangsterism

Rural

Low
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Type

4. Peasant
uprisings

High

High

-1 to 0

Low/Medium

Medium/High

Medium

High

Low/Medium

Low/Medium

Urban

-1 to +1

High

Low

Low/Medium

5. Urban riots

High

+1

None

Low/Medium

Medium

Low/Medium

Rural

High

-1 to +1

Low/Medium

Medium/High

High

Low

7. Revolutionary
warfare
Urban

Medium

-1 to 0

None to low

Medium/High

Low/Medium

8. Urban
revolution

Urban and rural

Low/Medium

-1 to +1

Low

-1 to +1

9. Assassination

Urban and rural

High

0 to +1

Low/Medium

10. Vigilante
violence

Urban

High

Rural

11. Coup d’état

Urban and rural

6. Guerrilla raids

12. Regime terror

Sederberg, 48.
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The Coup d’État
Placement on the Spectrum
There is considerable debate whether a coup d’état is a type of revolution or distinct from
it. Most tend to agree that a coup is “a stroke of force at the particular rulers of an established
system of government, usually executed by members of the ruling group, but not aimed at
changing the system.”42 For other scholars such as David C. Rapoport, the debate on whether a
coup is a revolution type is not as significant as recognizing its unpredictability and “extra-legal”
political meaning.43 The general consensus seems to consider a coup as a potentially
revolutionary tactic if successful, but not a revolution in itself; coups that do not lead to
revolutions are merely considered “acts of traitors or as instances of international subversion.”
Johnson states that a coup is theoretically welcomed if the system is in need of change, and
revolution may break out if the elite resist this change.44 As can be seen with Goldstone’s and
Sederberg’s representation of revolutionary change, a coup is not an isolated incident.45 Coups
differ in concept to the greater development to which they contribute; therefore, “the mere fact of
a coup does not imply any change in the social structure of society.”46
Bruce W. Farcau provided quite a profound and concentrated study on the coup d’état,
evaluating its nature as well as its form of execution. He describes a coup to be a nebulous
phenomenon to analyze due to its secretive nature, as it gains attention only toward the end or
after its occurrence and the documentation surrounding it is often unreliable. In his study, he
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considers the coup to be internal in nature, much like a “heart attack or a paralyzing stroke from
within the body politic,” and favors a more vague definition proposed by Edward Luttwak, in
which a coup is described as “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state
apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.”47
Despite all of its planning and organization, the physical act of a coup is “a short, sharp
action aimed at the seizure of the key functions of a state’s ruling system, usually coming to
fruition or failure within the space of twenty-four hours from the first overt act to the collapse of
either the target government or of the plot.”48 Farcau believes that due to its brief and specified
nature, coups are likely to be nonviolent in nature or do not need violence to be considered a
coup.49 Indeed, according to Sederberg’s degrees of violence and attributes, a coup has neither
widespread violence nor a high level of destruction and is also relatively low on its degree of
change and revolution type.50
Farcau provides the general process despite its uniqueness among different countries, and
divides it into the preparatory phase (or “control”) and the active phase (or “neutralization”); the
presence of violence depends on the success of the preparatory phase.51 A coup generally begins
with the formation of plotters who agree on a commitment to their plan. After they attempt their
first trial rebellion, they publicly declare the coup and seize the central governmental power. If
successful, they announce the newly created government and formally name its new members.
The first two constitute the preparatory stages, which determine the success and amount of
bloodshed that will likely take place. Although these stages are often ignored by the literature,
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Farcau states that they can provide clues as to what kind of regime will take over and the degree
of change that may follow.52
Frequency as a Possible Characteristic
Latin America has an unusually high proclivity for coups d’état; Carl J. Friedrich states
that coups d’état are “frequent in unstable monocratic systems, especially dictatorships and
tyrannies.”53 Rapoport states, although somewhat jaundiced, that violence is an inherent facet of
the governmental structure in this part of the world, and Huntington similarly likens a Latin
American revolution and coup to a type of election.54 “The Latin American military has brought
the coup d’état to the state of an art form which is only poorly copied in other societies.”55 Such
frequency can even create a certain psychological conditioning among the population, removing
the stress that would usually accompany such an event. Although only one coup accompanied
the revolutions of Nicaragua and Chile, unlike the several coups in such countries as Argentina
and Honduras, the mentality may yet seep into their cultures.

“Health” Terminology and Parameters
It seems, given the revolutionary spectrum, that revolutions and coups are likely to have a
significant impact on the health status and infrastructure in the post-revolution period.
Understanding public health and healthcare systems in general will help to understand its
connection with revolutions and the causal relationship they may embody. Although Bernard J.
Turnock focuses on the American public health system to derive his conclusions, his work is
useful to establish the basic concepts of public health from which a more country- or region-
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specific understanding may draw upon. He provides a list of contending definitions and explains
the complex inter- and multi-disciplinary nature of public health.
Defining Health and Public Health
Health and wellness are difficult terms to define;56 however, several scholars agree that
health is not mutually exclusive with disease, and that the concept of health has evolved from a
negative definition to a more positive one. The negative perspective, which developed during a
period of continuous epidemics, focuses on health as the absence of disease, indicating that
health and disease are of the same spectrum or continuum.57 Conversely, the positive
perspective developed as knowledge in public health increased and placed health and disease on
different spectrums, “with wellness and illness in one dimension and the presence or absence of
disease or injury in another.”58 The positive perspective defines health as the ability for people
to meet their normal roles and duties within society, creating a higher, albeit more subjective and
socially oriented, standard for the wellness of a population.59
These perspectives have revealed that disease is objective and wellness and illness are
subjective, and has further obfuscated the determination of a society’s health status. Thus, four
possible health conditions exist where wellness and illness can be either with or without disease
or injury, creating a greater difficulty in determining what constitutes health or wellness.60
Despite its subjectivity, this “social account,” namely the “ability to live and plan one’s life
56
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satisfactorily,” has surpassed the traditional indicators61 that do not fully indicate “health trends”
within a society.62
Sociocultural and Governmental Effects on Public Health
Society has a great influence on determining the definition of health; paraphrasing Hans
Schaefer’s findings from 1976, Ernst Schroeder writes that “definitions of health and illness are
therefore part and parcel of societies, cultures and epochs.”63 This is not to deny the possibility
of some universal aspects of health definitions, however. For example, the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) “definition of health as a state of complete physical, mental, and social
well-being” can be an applicable guide to all societies; illness is generally perceived as a state
that deviates from the norm and “is more socially than naturally determined.”64 Therefore,
public health must have an inherently broad definition that means something different to
different peoples;65 indeed, the definition of health in terms of an individual’s characteristics,
which includes “functional capacity…, pain, [and] emotional state,” relates to the societal
perspective of health and illness.66
In an attempt to address this issue, Turnock includes a partial list that defines public
health as (1) a “broad social enterprise or system,” (2) “professionals and work force whose job
it is to solve certain important health problems,” (3) “body of knowledge and techniques that can
be applied to health-related problems,” (4) “activities ascribed to governmental public health
agencies,” and (5) “literally the health of the public as measured in terms of health and illness in
a population.” Despite these contending or misconstrued views, Turnock states that one of the
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primary aspects of public health is that the health of an individual affects the health of society.67
Schroeder similarly links the individual and society and states that according to the “medicalscientific concept,” illness is perceived as that which creates problems for the individual and/or
community.68 Certain diseases or ailments can sometimes be deemed as an acceptable norm
within a culture or society; “an extreme example of clinical disease that was not regarded as
‘being ill’ in the relevant community is pinto (dichromic spirochetosis), a skin disease that is so
prevalent among some South American tribes that the few single men not suffering from it were
regarded as pathological to the point of being excluded from marriage (Ackerknecht 1947).”69
Turnock considers public health as a “movement” that constantly evolves to handle the
health problems of a population. The system begins with inputs in the form of “human,
organizational, informational, fiscal, and other resources” that are carried out through processes
or “practices.” These practices result in outputs such as programs or interventions, which then
create “health or quality-of-life outcomes,” or “desired results.”70 Public health is thus inherently
political in nature and inevitably linked with the government’s influence on public policies and
health-related programs; “history, culture, the structure of the government in question, and
current social circumstances” influence the evolution of the society’s public health that can either
improve or degrade according to governmental performance.71 Another implication of public
health’s political nature is that the values of health indicators, which are simply factors that
indicate a state of health, can change according to the change in a society’s dominant ideology.72
It is then a logical assumption that the analysis of health indicators during a revolutionary period
67
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may be problematic, but can still provide an indication of general health status when analyzed
among correct cultural and historical context.
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Section II: Literature Review
Introduction
Some argue that revolutions help to engender a need for societal improvement and public
awareness, particularly of health policy, while others argue that health status was usually the
same if not better in the pre-revolution period. Healthcare in both Nicaragua and Chile improved
after the revolution, most effectively at the community level with organizations such as the
Comités de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defense Committees, CDS) and the Asociación de
Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa Amanda Espinoza (Nicaraguan Women’s Association, AMNLAE)
of Nicaragua, as well as the Asociación Chilena de Proteción de la Familia (Chilean Family
Protection Association, APROFA) of Chile.73 However, as will be made clear in the coming
sections, regime types differed between these two countries. This apparent inconsistency leads to
confusion as to what regime types or how regime change can significantly influence healthcare.

Classifying Regimes and Regime Change
To determine at least a general effect of revolutions on health status and public health
policies, be they positive or negative, it is first necessary to classify regimes to understand the
nature of the change. Understanding the nature of revolutionary regime change can also
determine the significance of coups d’état on post-revolution health status. Unlike defining
revolution, regime types require a more precise definition and classification, as “regime labels
are essential for analyzing comparative historical processes, for describing regimes, and for
73
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studying regime breakdowns and transitions.”74 To overlook the complex diversity of regime
types and their changes would be both simplistic and inaccurate, but it must be understood that
“no nation’s political system is likely to be a pure regime type… Regimes are not only mixed
but can change over time.”75 Naturally, this sentiment has created contending definitions and
classifications within the literature, concerning not only the criteria for designation but also the
number of categories and how countries should be classified.
Focusing on Latin American countries, Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal
Pérez-Liñán have organized regime types according to their “trichotomous ordinal scale” which
labels regimes as democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian. In their study, they recognize the
inherent subjectivity in organizing regime typologies and claim that their ordinal scale eliminates
the more rigid dichotomies, the latter of which “better captures the significant variations in
regimes.”76 Other studies of particular interest to Latin America, such as those by John W.
Sloan, Guillermo O’Donnell, or Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merkx, acknowledge the
many variations among regimes but still characterize them as either democratic or a type of
authoritarianism.77 Both groups of scholars, proponents of either the dichotomous or the
trichotomous classification, are able to delve deep into Latin American politics; however, they
have distinct advantages and disadvantages that create differences between them. The former,
for instance, has the ability to compare the changes in policy performance on a more general
scale, whereas the latter accounts for specific regime change that can be used to determine
possible patterns concerning coups d’état. Although the present study will mainly draw upon the
74
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more progressive trichotomous scale to analyze data, the dichotomous organization will also
prove useful in understanding some key differences in regime type and change.
Regime Types
The Trichotomous Classification
The trichotomous ordinal scale clearly stipulates opposing characteristics for regime type,
namely democratic and authoritarian, but still allows flexibility in its classification by including
the intermediary regime “semidemocratic.” For Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán, a
democracy is a regime in which four necessary criteria must exist in conjunction, namely (1)
“free and fair competitive elections for the legislature and executive,” (2) “inclusive adult
citizenship,” (3) “protect[ion of] civil liberties and political rights,” and (4) the election of
governments that “really govern and the military is under civilian control.”78 A truly democratic
state exhibits all four of these criteria, while a semidemocratic states falters in up to three criteria.
Another fundamental differentiating factor is that change in a democratic government is achieved
by elections rather than coups.79
The advantage of trichotomous classification can be exemplified with El Salvador and
Guatemala during the 1980s when “free and fair elections with a broad suffrage” yet had the
“absence of an effective guarantee of civil liberties,” or with Argentina, Honduras, and
Guatemala in which the military guardianship as a constraining factor for civilian control; the
authors label these states as semidemocratic, as some “elements of democracy are impaired in
some fundamental way.”80 They state that to simply label these faltering democracies as
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authoritarian is “misleading,” especially when considering the complexity of post-1978 Latin
American regimes.81
Dichotomy and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism
It seems that the majority of other scholars are not as sympathetic to an intermediary
regime type between democracy and authoritarianism; a regime is either a democracy with
democratic characteristics or it is authoritarian with the absence of these characteristics. Other
scholars, however, incorporate the more particularized characteristics of Latin American regimes
and have labeled the nondemocratic regime type as the more indicative “bureaucraticauthoritarian” or “modernizing authoritarian.” Nonetheless, they argue that democracy is an
“authentic and persistent motif,” but one that is intermittent.82
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism, a term most notably identified with Guillermo O’Donnell,
is “likely to occur in nations that have undergone relatively substantial bureaucratization,
industrialization, and mass mobilization,” and is “an elite response to the alleged policy failure of
a democratic regime.”83 O’Donnell states that the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarianism
especially in Brazil and Argentina can be attributed to three fundamental elements, including (1)
“the growing political weight of lower middle- and working-class groups,” (2) “the appearance
of economic ‘bottlenecks,’” and (3) “the increased significance of technocratic roles.”84 Various
political crises play key roles in the emergence of a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in
advanced societies (i.e., Brazil 1964, Argentina 1966 and 1976, and Chile and Uruguay in 1973),
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as well as the formation and execution of a coup coalition.85 With a key component of the
regime being modernization, it “is a type of military rule often interpreted as novel in relation to
the early history of Latin America. It was generally led by the military as an institution, in
contrast to the personalistic rule of individual officers,” and is often “accompanied by intense
repression” as well as coercion.86
Some scholarly proponents of bureaucratic-authoritarianism compare the advantages of
this regime with those of democracy and state that it promotes economic growth “by freeing the
technocrats from democratic accountability” in order to “pursue economic strategies that aid
elites at the expense of most of the population.”87 It has been argued, however, that economic
growth and restoration in these regime types have a higher probability of success if the level of
“crisis and threat” is low in the pre-revolution period.88 Remmer and Merkx describe
O’Donnell’s concept of threat as that which affects the socioeconomic stability, the
consequences of which are repression and “political deactivation.” The presence of the latter
factor in particular progresses the bureaucratic-authoritarian state from its “first stage” of
attracting foreign capital to its “second stage” in which a nationalist bourgeoisie class is
instituted into the ruling class.89 Despite these findings, Remmer and Merkx admit that threat
levels before the coup only partially explain changes in economic performance.90
Nonetheless, from a democratic perspective, this economic superiority is only a shortterm advantage as these regimes “inevitably become rigid, self-serving, corrupt, and incapable of
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adjusting policy priorities to changing conditions.”91 It seems that only “democratic regimes
have the policy capabilities to achieve a variety of developmental goals without suffering the
high levels of repression that often accompany bureaucratic-authoritarian rule;”92 in other words,
although democracies may be laden with time-consuming procedures that can slow economic
progress, they do not advocate repression as a means to this economic end. The trichotomous
scale would find the combination of these democratic and nondemocratic characteristics as
semidemocratic, as it is not outright authoritarianism; however, it is nevertheless difficult to
gloss over the illegitimate means of repression.
Indeed, O’Donnell recognizes the inability for bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes to
achieve legitimacy. Remmer and Merkx succinctly summarize his defining characteristics of
this regime and state that “its dependence on international capital weakens its claims to represent
the nation; it is self-imposed rather than based on the consent of its citizenry; and it transparently
serves the interests of the upper bourgeoisie, rather than the people.”93 Fundamental changes in
the political system and economic structure with a regime change to bureaucraticauthoritarianism.94

Latin American Cases
The revolutions in neither Nicaragua nor Chile could be classified among the “grand” or
“total” revolutions of Russia, China, or France; these Latin American revolutions were of a
different essence, without a version of Trotsky to accompany their political upheaval in history.
However, as seen in the previous section, the classification of “revolution” has evolved
throughout the years, becoming more inclusive. Although the events in these two Latin
91
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American countries may not be quite as grand as the revolutions preceding them, they are
nevertheless counted as revolutions by several notable scholars of worthy academic standing. A
brief definition of their revolution, coup, and regime change would benefit this discussion.
Gurr and Goldstone state that Nicaragua had state crises, elite alienation, mass
mobilization, revolutionary struggle, and the successful outcome of the revolutionaries over the
old regime;95 based upon the aforementioned trichotomous scale, its regime changed from
authoritarian (under the Somoza family) to semidemocratic (under the revolutionary
Sandinistas). Chile, on the other hand, experienced a somewhat different change, but there was
no doubt that its revolution was a similarly significant polity change, from democratic (with a
long history of electoral competition), to bureaucratic-authoritarian (under General Pinochet).
The revolution in Chile was slightly more complicated and subtle than that of Nicaragua, as it
was mired by conspiratory tactics masked by the democratic process.
Despite the slight differences between the two revolutions, both Nicaragua and Chile
changed their political leadership through a coup d’état. There is some debate whether these can
be classified as coups; the Coup Data Codebook disqualifies Chile’s 1973 coup, Farcau similarly
disqualifies Nicaragua’s 1979 coup. However, the present study disagrees with these
disqualifications since the leaders Somoza and Allende were forcibly ousted, albeit by means of
formal resignation (considered autogolpes, or self-coups). The level of violence or number of
coup conspirators should not be the sole determining factors in classifying these coups; both
coups were a revolutionary tactic, as each played a part in changing the political or social system
of the country.
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Powell and Thyne consider coup attempts to be “illegal and overt attempts by the military
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive,” and is successful if “the
perpetrators seize and hole power for at least seven days.”96 Some scholars would not consider
an autogolpe, or self-coup, to be considered a true coup d’état;97 indeed, Farcau does not
consider the overthrow of Anatasio Somoza during the Nicaraguan Revolution to be a coup
d’état, because it is a conflict of longer duration.98 However, both Nicaragua and Chile exhibited
sufficient political pressure on the leader as to indicate an indirect overthrow that would have
otherwise led to eventual assassination. In addition, Nicaragua’s revolution had elements of both
rural against urban (urban revolution) and urban against the center (revolutionary warfare).99
These coups were also used as revolutionary tactics to dramatically change either the polity
(Chile) or social structure (Nicaragua) of the country.
Ted Robert Gurr states that “a coup d’état in the pre-revolution situation can forestall
massive violence, for example, by removing hated symbols of political repression and offering
hopes for the alleviation of deprivation.”100 Contrary to the predictions of O’Donnell, Chile’s
1973 coup gave rise to extreme violence despite its “high threat.”101 However, Chile’s high level
of threat in its pre-revolution period did indeed hinder economic growth, but this is only a partial
explanation. Although there is a difference between the two countries concerning violence and
the probability of economic recovery in the post-revolution period, it has been made clear that
neither economic decay nor the level of violence accompanying the coup d’état necessarily
affects healthcare or health status.
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Coup d’État and the Latin American Military
The presence of a coup indicates a government’s institutional limits and capabilities, and
a “coup-prone society, a praetorian society,” has a small portion of the population engaged in
politics while the rest are apathetic.102 Huntington explains that a coup d’état can occur from the
struggle for power among the classes; since the creation of the more modern society, the officers
involved are often from the middle classes, and it is this middle class military that represses the
lower masses that demand redistribution of resources. This is a neo-Marxist view in that the
military has a similar interest with the bourgeoisie to politically expel these masses from
participation, a situation that can create the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime as exemplified by
1960s Brazil and Argentina and 1970s Chile and Uruguay.103
Modernizationists such as Huntington believe that this middle class military can help
develop society, whereas Determinists believe that the development of Latin America contrasts
the interests of both the military and bourgeoisie. “It is the military, however, that is especially
sensitive to the need for modernization in order to augment the military power of the state.”104
However, Farcau disagrees with the Determinist argument and states that class origin should not
make a considerable difference in military sentiment; furthermore, the officer is physically and
socially isolated from civilian society by immersion, losing the once shared commonality and
engendering hostility toward civilians. He also argues that the military is usually at odds with
the interests of the bourgeoisie, as they tend to favor laissez-faire economics and comparative
advantage. Therefore, the military enacts a coup d’état regardless of middle class interests.105
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Coups d’état seem to be a normal method of governmental change in Latin America, and
at times have had a hand in revolution, considered by some to be a “revolutionary coup d’état.”
However, some scholars distinguish between varying degrees of coups d’état such as a palace
revolution (sovereign replacement from within), cuartelazo (military uprising, democratic),
putsch (military uprising, conspiracy), golpe de estado (military uprising); Farcau describes the
former two as successful coups while a putsch is an instance of limited military mobilization. He
also states that coups take on a more traumatic definition within democratic regimes than in
others, while the perpetual normalcy with which coups are mostly viewed in Latin American
societies may contribute to underdevelopment and instability.106
There is a limitation to the significance of a coup d’état within revolutionary situations.
Coups are not linked to high revolutionary potential and do not have high ideological
involvement.107 Nor do they necessarily ensure that the change in government will solve the
problems. “Once the military seizes the reins of government and finds itself confronted by the
same intractable problems that overwhelmed its predecessors, the stage is set for factional
conflict within the military, and a succession of apparently unending coups d’état.”108 A coup
depends on motive and opportunity, and either succeeds when both elements are present, does
not occur when both elements are low or nonexistent, or will fail if there is strong motivation but
weak opportunity. Farcau characterizes Latin American coups with opportunity but inadequate
motivation. “Chile was viewed as a rock of stability in Latin America, not having had a coup for
more than a generation, but the military was always standing in the wings and had merely not
chosen to intervene prior to its bloody assumption of power in 1973.”109 Apart from this
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exception in Chile, the military in Latin America almost always finds a need to intervene, since it
is “likely to be especially intolerant of the factionalism of civilian politicians and the high
incidence of corruption typical of government bureaucracies.”110 Apart from Cuba and
Nicaragua, Latin America in general has an abysmally small military force without proper
equipment. It is nevertheless well suited for coups d’état despite its general inefficiency.111
State Characteristics
Thomas John Bossert accounts for socioeconomic differences among regime types by
listing four main characteristics of (1) state power, (2) stability, (3) ideological orientation, and
(4) “degree of democratic participation in policymaking.” State power, he explains, is “its
capacity to control the lower classes and at the same time pursue policies;” this power gives the
state a technocratic bureaucracy (which is particularly indicative of a bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime), a form of autonomy from the “dominant class factions,” and the ability to extract
resources from its population. Strong states successfully implement health care policies, while
orienting the health system toward preventative care and a focus on the rural poor.112 Bossert
explains that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes are relatively stable, with a certain longevity
(Pinochet’s regime lasted over a decade) and the “absence of significant competing elites who
violently challenge the legitimacy of the regime.” This seems to fit Chile quite well, but the
third factor of “regularity of legally scheduled leadership changes” is absent.113 As for
reformism, or the “ideological characteristics of the state,” he argues that bureaucraticauthoritarian regimes tend to pursue “progressive social policies” and “inclusionary policies”
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which are beneficial for new health policies;114 as will be demonstrated in the upcoming Data
Analysis, Chile and its revolutionary health policies fit the descriptions that Bossert attributes to
a bureaucratic-authoritarian polity. It must be noted here that Chile can easily be considered
unstable in its pre-revolution period, based upon the factionalism reference in the Polity IV
project; however, this can be debated, as Chile had regular electoral competition and a relatively
high health status prior to the revolution.
Table 2-1: State Characteristics of Nicaragua and Chile, Pre- and Post-Revolution115

Nicaragua

Chile

Pre-revolution

Post-revolution

Pre-Revolution

Post-revolution

Leader

Somoza

Sandinistas

Allende

Pinochet

Strength

Weak

Strong

Weak

Strong

Stability

Stable

Unstable

Unstable

Stable

Ideology

Status Quo

Reformist

Reformist

Status Quo

Polity

Authoritarian

Semidemocracy

Democracy

Bureaucratic-Authoritarian

Similar to the supporting logic for the trichotomous ordinal scale of regime types, Bossert
argues that “these four dimensions give us a richer means of categorizing the state than the
earlier simple dichotomies without ignoring the intuitive clarity of these dichotomies;” he further
adds that this method can detect any present relationship between regime and health care
policy.116 He suggests that democratic states that exhibit strength and stability along with
progressive ideology are ideal for effective healthcare policies. These factors are also
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codependent; “for instance, weak progressive regimes would be more successful in adopting and
implementing primary care than would weak regimes that were not progressive.”117
Implications for Policy Analysis
Bossert’s findings indicate that healthcare policy adoption is not sufficiently affected by
any one of the above four factors. Although instability in a “status quo ideology” regime may
lead to reforms, instability or ideology alone do not account for the adoption of healthcare
policies. Rather, Bossert suggests that the combination of the two creates a greater likelihood of
adopting healthcare policies. Although there was only case study (Costa Rica) to support this
hypothesis, the results indicated that weak and unstable regimes such as Guatemala and
Honduras were unable to have centralized and integrated healthcare policies. As predicted, these
two weak regimes also heavily relied on foreign aid to support their programs, whereas the
strong state of Costa Rica was able to fund its policies from within.118
The methodological shift from the 1960s and 1970s to the 1980s has highlighted the
importance on analyzing regime change in order to determine the efficacy of national policies
such as those in healthcare. Understanding the “broader political process” can provide context
for policy implementation and outcome, as well as determining the regime’s economic structure;
the latter of which is particularly beneficial when analyzing bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimes.119 Determining the nature of a regime not only indicates the significance of its
transformation but also allows for a deeper contextual analysis to determine the degree of
significance.

117

Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis?,” 427.
Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis?,” 435-438.
119
Bossert, “Can We Return to the Regime for Comparative Policy Analysis?,” 419-420.
118

34

Bossert argues that differences and changes in regime type can elucidate the differences
among national programs for primary care, and includes (1) integration, (2) centralization, (3)
participation, (4) funding level, and (5) foreign funding as fundamental indices. Integration of
these programs effectively reduces “inefficient duplication of effort, conflict over
responsibilities, and projects working at cross-purposes.”120 As with other health programs,
integration improves the overall practical efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the programs to
ensure it achieves its potential, and can even improve the nation’s own capacity-building.121 The
benefit of centralization over that of decentralization is debatable; Bossert argues, however, that
when combined with integration, centralization proves to be beneficial to national policy.
Community participation has proven to be a key determinant in implementing successful national
policies, particularly with healthcare, as it more effectively reaches the more marginalized rural
areas of a nation. The funding level and the amount of foreign funding indicate respectively the
nation’s ability to sufficiently allocate resources according to priority and its level of foreign
dependence to implement its national programs.122
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Table 2-2: Policy Adoption and Implementation Processes123
Costa Rica

Honduras

Guatemala

Nicaragua

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Integration

Integrated

Integrated

Fragmented

NA

Centralization

Centralized

Decentralized

Centralized

NA

Participation

Low

High

Moderate

NA

Funding Level

High

Low

Low

NA

Foreign Funding

Low

High

High

NA

Adoption

Bossert concludes that not one of his hypotheses “relating policy adoption to single
dimensions of the regime typology is supported,” but rather a particular combination of several
regime dimensions and typology; “the regime characteristics that appear to be most explanatory
are not the single dimension dichotomies of the earlier aggregate data studies but rather a
complex relationship in which several dimensions are contingent on each other.”124 Neither
weak regimes nor those lacking in democratic participation will necessarily shy away from
policy adoption, particularly if they have a centralized and integrated program for appropriate
administration. However, Bossert has found that weak states demonstrate the proclivity to adopt
health policies without the threatening combination of centralization and integration, but they
will also depend heavily on foreign aid.125
Although Bossert excludes Nicaragua’s health policy adoption, the present study argues
that Nicaragua did indeed adopt healthcare policies mostly during the post-revolution period.
Fragmentation, decentralization, and participation increased during the post-revolution period in
both Nicaragua and Chile, but as seen with Table 2-1, both countries changed from a weak to a
strong state; perhaps it is this combination, rather than regime type, that allowed for the
123
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implementation of an integrated healthcare policy regardless of severely reduced foreign funding
and the differing percentages of GDP dedicated to health expenditures.
Table 2-3: Change in Health Policy in Nicaragua and Chile126
Nicaragua

Chile

Pre-revolution

Post-revolution

Pre-Revolution

Post-revolution

Polity

Authoritarian

Semidemocracy

Democracy

Authoritarian

Integration

Fragmented

Integrated

Integrated

Fragmented

Centralization

Centralized

Decentralized

Centralized

Decentralized

Participation

Low

High

Moderate

High

Funding Level

Moderate (2.3%)

High (5.8%)

Low (1.1%)

Low (1.7%)

Foreign Funding

High

Moderate

High

Low/Moderate

Regimes are not entirely related to health policy adoption. As will be seen with supporting
evidence in the coming sections, Nicaragua implemented successful health policies without
depending on foreign aid. Although its health status was initially lower than that of Chile from
the start, it made significant progress throughout its post-revolution period. Its improvement
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cannot be adequately attributed to its change to democracy. Although Chile began with a higher
status than Nicaragua, it still witnessed improvement in healthcare and health status despite its
change to bureaucratic-authoritarianism.

“Healthcare” and “Improvement”
What is meant by “improvement” must be made clear. Improvement will constitute the
overall progression of health status within the country, indicated by such factors as the decrease
of infant mortality rate (IMR), increase of life expectancy (LE), and adoption of inclusive
policies. This will be significantly expanded to include other factors in Data Analysis. Human
rights abuses will be acknowledged, but the analysis of health status improvement will focus on
the abovementioned factors.
It is difficult to ascertain which new health policy is truly a result of the revolution, since
revolutionary countries approach healthcare changes differently. “It is extremely difficult to
isolate the impact of health care systems from the impact of other variables, not the least being
socioeconomic change.”127 During the coup- and revolution-prone decades of 1960 to 1980,
many countries demonstrated impressive progress in health status and healthcare policies; Latin
America as a whole showed significant IMR reduction from 107 per 1,000 in 1955-1960 to 61
per 1,000 in 1980-1985.128 Thus, it is argued that the emphasis on better public health can be a
more ubiquitous occurrence, and need not depend on revolution.129
Bossert states that this “primary care approach” can be the focus of revolutionary efforts,
however, but this assumption must include the factors of (1) “greater equality of access to health
services, both by increasing services to lower classes, and most important, by providing access in
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the rural areas where large populations previously had no access at all,” (2) “improved
preventative measures such as provision of clean water, sanitation, nutrition, immunizations,
maternal and child health – activities which are more likely to improve health than are physicianoriented curative services,” (3) “considerable participation of communities in establishing local
health priorities and implementing local health programs,” and (4) “equity, prevention, and
participation” within the allocated national budget.130 Thus, a focus on rural access, preventative
medicine and community-based programs to increase health literacy are fundamental factors in
healthcare improvement.
Latin American Tendencies
Sloan found that both democratic and authoritarian regimes have demonstrated improved
capabilities in education and health. Democratic regimes have shown considerable improvement
from 1960-1980, such as a general increase in LE from sixty to sixty-nine years. Although Latin
American authoritarian regimes mostly outperformed their democratic counterparts in education
and literacy as seen in Argentina and Chile, health policies were overall less impressive. It must
be noted that literacy rates in these particular countries were already impressive prior to the
regime change, however; “in the 1980s, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico had over 95 percent of
their children between the ages of six and eleven in school.”131 Health and education systems
must be inherently strong to withstand any regime changes, for Sloan notes that democratic
regimes are more flexible and thus able to successfully adapt. High adaptability depends on a
high level of institutionalization, and “success in adapting to one environmental challenge paves
the way for successful adaptation to subsequent environmental challenges.”132
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In general, healthcare policies that focus on maternal and child health and basic sanitation
in conjunction with adequate education will improve the health status of a country.133 Two
particular studies on healthcare policy and revolutionary regime change have listed four relevant
factors that indicate the level of policy performance, including (1) urbanization, (2) the economy,
(3) income inequality, and (4) rural access. Both agree that the economy does not have a
significant impact on health policy performance while income inequality is the primary negative
element, “including when controls are inserted for overall affluence and even for absolute
poverty.”134
Although a lower GDP per capita disallows for resources such as food and shelter, it is
not necessarily an inhibiting factor for improving health status. Cuba and Venezuela are prime
examples in which health status improved greatly despite their slow economic growth, thus
rendering the “healthier is wealthier” sentiment inaccurate.135 Furthermore, one study found that
“improvements in earlier years had occurred in Chile during a period marked by several
recessions, hyperinflation, and unemployment. In fact, the evolution of improved infant and
child health proved to be independent of economic cycles.”136 A high IMR generally occurs in
countries with low GDP per capita, but mostly when it is compounded by low administrative
capacity; programs and educational interventions as forms of preventative medicine will help to
improve such mortality rates.137 Indeed, as seen in Chile, environmental factors such as safe
water and basic sanitation affected the neonatal IMR more than that of postneonatal, but this
reversed as healthcare became more organized and available.138
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The level of a country’s development is also a tenuous link to revolutionary change in
healthcare; a study on Chile’s success in healthcare theorized that “the country, although still
only at a middle level of development, has reached levels of attainment comparable with those of
higher-income countries.”139 Nevertheless, access to the rural population is fundamental for
improving the health status of a nation, as well as the somewhat counterintuitive increase in
urbanization as seen in Chile.140 James W. McGuire and Laura B. Frankel argued that Cuba’s
pre-revolution government was even more successful than its post-revolution government. After
the revolution, however, it was the combination of the “expansion of health care, family
planning, education, sanitation, and water provisioning among the poor, together with its
redistribution of income in favor of the poor” that continued its success in health status.141 One
study noted, however, that the disparity between urban and rural communities has been diluted,
as rural housing, doctor to patient ratio, and the lack of hospital beds were inequitable. However,
the number of medical personnel was greatly expanded and available service was a priority,
albeit at the cost of quality.142

Summary
It has been suggested in this limited literature review that the level of development,
economic status, and wealth do not affect healthcare policies as much as urbanization, income
inequality, rural access, and a focus on preventative (rather than curative) medicine.
Furthermore, public health policies may or may not be affected by regime change itself.
Although healthcare becomes a focus in the post-revolution period, the “permanence of primary
care policies” in the post-revolution period depends on the strength of the healthcare system in
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the pre-revolution period.143 Military coups d’état can nevertheless inhibit democratic
development, and modernization affects health determinants more than “government
provisioning of social services.”144 The adoption and success of healthcare policy also depends
on (1) the success of healthcare policy in various regimes, and (2) determining the health status
and polity after the occurrence of a coup d’état and revolution.
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Section III: Methodology and Theoretical Framework
Introduction
The health status of a population can be determined by a numerous and sometimes
complex set of determinants.145 This complexity is especially true during times of crisis such as
revolutions and coups d’état when data may be skewed or lost, or even exaggerated. Culture also
plays an additionally complicating role in determining the perspective of health performance.

Methodology for Data Analysis
Longitudinal and cross-cultural studies are made difficult to pursue since determinants
constantly change. Additionally, “the more varied the conditions to which the measure is going
to be applied, the more universal and the less specific the measure will have to be.”146 Thus, the
case studies in the present analysis focuses on the two Latin American countries of Nicaragua
and Chile in order to include more specific health indicators and thus gain a more precise
understanding of how revolutions affect health status and if coups d’état are indeed a
compounding factor.
Section IV first briefly introduces each of the selected countries with pre- and postrevolution historical context, from which their respective revolutions can be classified according
to the trichotomous ordinal scale as defined by Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán. This
history also provides relevant context to elucidate any other factors that may influence postrevolution healthcare efforts and health status, as well as provide a timeline for referencing data.
Health status and the efficacy of health programs can be partially determined through indicators
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such as IMR, LE, and crude death rates. The IMR tables are colored according to polity changes
to display the association between regime and health. Health indicators are further crossreferenced with indicators such as GDP figures, the GINI Index, and education levels to
determine the influence of a revolution and coup d’état on social and economic aspects, or lack
thereof. Some comparative remarks are then made to elucidate any similarities or differences
between the two countries. Determinants are supported by official data provided by such
databases as Polity IV and the World Bank, as well as the data presented in the previous section
such as Sederberg’s degrees of violence and revolution.

Defining Health Indicators
Health status should be thought of in terms of outcome, which is the “improved health
status in the population” as the “desired results” of outputs.147 The efficacy of health
interventions is determined by examining the outputs of health policies, programs, and services
with such variables as the number of physicians and the level of community involvement; health
programs are also useful in that they “detect early and presymptomatic stages of certain diseases”
through preventative care.148 Health status can be determined by indicators such as IMR and LE.
Thus, both health status and the efficacy of health interventions provide useful indications of
post-revolution performance.
Quite simply, a health indicator indicates a state of health and the changes in that state.
As stated in the previous section, health is commonly seen as the absence of disease, but illness
is not necessarily the presence of disease.149 It was also stated that measures of function are best
used with the sociomedical definition because it indicates the quality of life. The measure of
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disability and the “diagnostic conditions giving rise to the disability” are necessary to truly
understand health status.150 Dominant ideology can change the values of indicators, but it must
be understood that ideology can change as well as within revolutionary change.151
Types of Health Indicators
Disease and mortality are often used as measures for health status rather than actual
health; although “mortality as a proxy for health” has inherent problems, Turnock argues, it can
be used to gain a general understanding of population health status.152 Turnock has divided
mortality-based indicators into four types. The first is the fundamental crude mortality in which
the “deaths within the entire population…are not sensitive to differences in age distribution of
different populations.” The second measure creates more specificity of the first and is labeled
age-specific and age-adjusted mortality, which measures the “number of deaths to the number of
persons in a specific age group;” IMR is included in this measure. Third is LE, a commonly
used indicator for comparative purposes and is a “computation of the number of years between
any given age…and the average age of death for that population.” Finally, the years of potential
life lost (YPLL) “places greater weight on deaths that occur at younger ages,” where an arbitrary
age is used to “measure the relative impact on society of different causes of deaths.”153
WHO defines child mortality rate as the probability of death before the age of five while
IMR is the probability of death before the first year; the latter thus includes neonatal (birth to one
month) and postneonatal (one month to the first year). Child and infant mortality rates are
relevant indicators to determine the nation’s child health status as the name implies and the
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overall development of the nation; IMR is a particularly useful indicator of population health in
underdeveloped countries with incomplete data.154 It has been argued that these indicators can
also be used to determine the level of equity, which is of fundamental value to compare health
status and performance;155 along with the GINI Index, income disparities can be quite thoroughly
determined. A complicating factor that must be noted is the possible omission of abortions and
low-birthweight infants from birth and death records, which naturally “complicate infant
mortality comparisons, even among rich countries.”156 Further adding to this margin of error is
disqualifying malnutrition as a cause of death, despite its usually high prevalence in rural
areas.157 Of course, the lack of records makes it difficult if not impossible to determine the
number of infants who fall into this category, and compel the researcher to accept that factors
such as high abortion rates can skew mortality rates.
Income inequality within a country can be a valuable indicator. In a study comparing
healthcare in post-revolution Mexico with that of Cuba, Chile, and Nicaragua four main
variables were used to determine population health, including morbidity, mortality, incidence
and prevalence of disease, and age and cause of death.158 Due to the extreme disparity between
urban and rural areas, James J. Horn found that most of the mortality in Mexico was due to
preventable diseases; it “is characterized by high rates of nutritional, infectious, and parasitic
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diseases which are largely an outcome of poverty and its environmental cognates.”159 He also
argues that malnutrition was the leading cause of “excessive mortality” and infectious diseases
while the lack of potable water and adequate sanitation (together with education about sanitation)
were cause of preventable parasitic and diarrheal diseases.160 Additionally, Turnock agrees that
population growth compounds health problems, particularly for the poor.161 Accounting for
income inequality demonstrates the prevalence of either preventable or chronic diseases, which
in turn affects the need for preventative medicine (opposed to curative), rural access to health
services, and the level of education and literacy.
Other noteworthy determinants are education and literacy especially among women, the
physical environment and the presence of threats, urbanization, and community involvement in
health services and promotions. Health system factors such as doctors per region and the doctorpopulation ratio are also highly influential in determining health status.162
Risk Factors
Social and cultural influences focus on “socioeconomic status and poverty,” but Turnock
states that they are largely imprecise. Nevertheless, mortality rates differ among the different
social classes, even in the modern era and particularly among developing countries; “differences
in mortality appear to relate primarily to inequalities in material resources, although the use of
educational status as a proxy for social standing” may also be related.163 Nonetheless, such
indicators as LE are better determined among developing countries by understanding disparities
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in income rather than simply GDP or GNP statistics. “Societies create and shape the diseases
they experience,” and thus “health should be viewed as a social phenomenon.”164
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Section IV: Data analysis
Introduction
Nicaragua and Chile have been chosen for comparative study on their healthcare systems
and health status, as they have similar revolutionary processes and time parameters. Historical
context for each country will first be given, followed by context and data for each country’s
health sector. While cross-referenced with the Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLAC) and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC),
statistics will be drawn primarily from the World Bank, and the works of scholars Garfield and
Williams for Nicaragua and James W. McGuire for Chile. Regime change and categorization is
measured according to the polity classification of Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán. They
provide a comprehensive trichotomous and longitudinal scale that is adequate for this study.
Polity IV will also be used to identify any periods of interregnum and factionalism that may
create disruptions for health. Coups d’état will be categorized according to Powell and Thyne
and other categorizations from Section I.

Contextual Background
Nicaragua
Pre-revolution History
Prior to the revolution, Nicaragua was an oligarchic society that monopolized land
distribution and excluded the majority of the population. When the nation became involved with
coffee production, it brought about a “decline in Liberal-Conservative conflict, greater stability,
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and the consolidation of state power,” which was achieved by foreign intervention.165 Nicaragua
is “one of the most highly urbanized countries in Latin America,” and each of its three regions
has distinct economies. The Pacific area in particular is linked with the United States and was
controlled and monopolized by the Somoza to export cotton and sugar. Inherent income
disparities were created when the small-scale farmers were forced to work on estates.166
The United States’ occupation in Nicaragua between 1912 and 1933 weakened the
“development of autonomous political institutions;”167 the necessary infrastructure was not in
place to successfully withstand socioeconomic crises, which would be particularly detrimental
with the eventual downfall of the Somoza. During the occupation and with the help of the
United States Marines, Anastasio Somoza Garcia was elected as the commander of the National
Guard by Juan Bautista Sacasa (whom Somoza would later oust to become president himself in
1936). Dévora Grynspan states that Somoza’s relationship with the National Guard was
neopatrimonial and corrupt and “with the U.S. help, Somoza was able to maintain control of the
National Guard, undermine the Liberal party, co-opt the Conservative party, and repress labor
union and the left,” as well as barred the formation of a consolidated elite leadership.168
Although Cesar Augusto Sandino and his supporters attempted to oppose Somoza’s control of
the National Guard, both he and his supporters were assassinated by Somoza’s command. After
Somoza was assassinated in 1956, the power remained in the family as his two sons Luis
Somoza Debayle and Anastasio “Tachito” Somoza Debayle assumed leadership, the latter of
whom was especially repressive in his methods.169
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Infrastructural investments during the 1950s and 1960s expanded Managua’s financial
and commercial capabilities and improved GDP and literacy rates. Together, the Somoza family,
Liberal, and Conservative oligarchic factions monopolized the economy in tandem. The Somoza
family took advantage of their piece of monopoly and placed themselves at an advantageous
position with land and infrastructure, this resulted in greater landholding for the Somoza and
dispossession for peasants, therefore increasing the urban population from 19% in 1950 to 47%
in 1970 (which would continue to rise to 54% in 1980).
The “favorable international conditions and high growth rates” that helped the Somoza
family began to decline in the 1960s with the emergence of state crises, and Nicaragua could not
keep up with the high rate of urbanization. By the 1970s, 41% of the urban population and 80%
of the rural population were poor, and 42.4% and 55.4% respectively were in extreme poverty.170
Extreme inequality, uneven land distribution, low literacy levels (25%), a small working class,
and a poor majority were dangerous elements to compound on a society.171 The economic crisis
and 1972 earthquake merely exacerbated the brazen corruption of the Somoza regime, and broke
the tenuous coexistence of the Somoza, Liberal, and Conservative parties, inciting elite
opposition. The earthquake enticed the Somoza family to siphon international aid, which
brought to light the true level of their corruption; indeed, “the 1972 earthquake was the main
catalyst for popular mobilization and upper-class defection.”172
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Figure 4-1: Nicaragua: GDP per capita growth (annual percentage)173
15
10
5
Percent

0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
Revolution & Coup

-30
-35

Year

It was at this time of economic and natural crises that the Frente Sandinista de Liberación
Nacional (FSLN)174 was established and gained influence, and in turn granted the worker and
student groups significant oppositional power upon joining forces. In 1974, the editor of La
Prensa Pedro Joaquin Chamorro established the Union Democrática de Liberación (Democratic
Union of Liberation, UDEL), accompanied by other similar groups began to form and involved
students and the working class, namely the Partido Liberal Independiente (Independent Liberal
Party, PLI), Partido Socialista Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Socialist Party, PSN), and the Partido
Social Cristiano Nicaragüense (Social Christian Party of Nicaragua, PSCN); the Group of
Twelve, or Los Doce, formed in 1977 and “was to be the basis of the future revolutionary
government.”175
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These organizational efforts of the opposition were met with extremely violent
repression, which increased instability and crisis within Nicaragua.176 It was heavily suspected
that the Somoza family ordered the assassination of Chamorro due to his reports on the
plasmaferesis pharmaceutical company run in partnership between the Somozas and Arnoldo
“Vampire” Ramos; blood plasma, which was mostly donated by the poor due to the economic
crisis, was sold to the United States. The assassination of Chamorro in January of 1978 led to a
massive protest to raze Somoza businesses, particularly targeting the plasmaferesis.177 It must be
noted here that there is some slight disagreement as to whether this assassination was a positive
or negative influence on the antisomocista (anti-Somoza) movement. Garfield and Williams
argue that the death of Chamorro led to an insurrection led by the FSLN with a positive effect,
whereas Grynspan believes that his death adversely affected the burgeoning movement.178
Considering the subsequent insurrection and collapse of the Somoza regime at the hand of the
Sandinistas, it seems that the assassination only exacerbated rebellious sentiment. Nonetheless,
the true impact of these antisomocista actions and the Somoza retaliation on the healthcare
system will be described in more detail in the following subsection devoted to Nicaraguan
health.
Revolution and Post-revolution History
The mid-1970s witnessed an increase of repression and torture against the opposition as
well as increased siphoning and corruption of international funds. Grynspan argues that the key
moment that elucidated the National Guard’s “impotence” and the “military capabilities” of the
FSLN was the incident at the National Palace, where the FSLN held over 1,500 hostages until
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their demands to release some of their members were realized.179 Additionally, the
aforementioned strikes and protests in 1978 resulted in the death of over 5,000 of Somoza’s
National Guard, and it was then that the other Latin American countries began to help the
opposition.180 When Somoza guardsmen murdered ABC reporter Bill Stewart and his
Nicaraguan interpreter Juan Francisco Espino for attempting a recorded interview, the Somoza
dictatorship became an international concern and “the Carter administration essentially ordered
Somoza to leave Nicaragua.”181 By withholding foreign aid and supporting the Sandinistas, “a
maximally permissive international environment existed with regard to the revolution” and
Somoza fled to Miami, Florida.182 After the resignation of Somoza, the National Guard
dissolved and the post-revolution junta took over Managua on July 19.183
As with many post-revolution governments, the Sandinistas inherited a nation in
physical, economic, social, and political disrepair.184 Nonetheless, “the great accomplishment of
the Nicaraguan Revolution was the destruction of the horrendous neopatrimonial dictatorship of
Somoza and its replacement by regimes generally committed to democracy and pluralism.”185
Indeed, the new government attempted to address the relevant issues and began to officially
organize and created a five-person junta comprised of two private-sector representatives, an
official FSLN representative, and two other FSLN members. Its general characteristics can be
considered a “mix of Marxism, Christian defense of the poor, and nationalism.”186
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Ultimately, the new Nicaraguan government would not be able to implement its original
intended policies and ideologies; instead these idealistic and somewhat impractical desires
changed to address more pressing and pragmatic concerns for post-revolution reconstruction.187
After creating an alliance with the bourgeoisie, albeit a tenuous one, the first action of the postrevolution government was a major economic reform that nationalized private property. The
bourgeoisie were not given real power, however, and harbored beliefs that “the ultimate goal of
the FSLN was a transition to socialism and thus an eventual nationalization of private
enterprise.”188 Indeed, these reforms were eventually met with opposition when the banking
system and other property became nationalized, despite its original popular support.189 The new
economic policies generally led to disheartening results. Producers of all economic sizes were
“hurt by higher wages, government prices, and currency overvaluation as well as by low
international prices;” the FSLN attempted to compensate the producers for this loss by offering
land and credit reductions for landlords and peasants, but it had diminutive effect since these
efforts did not coincide with “technical assistance” and the urban sector.190
Similarly frustrating yet successful were the attempts of sociopolitical transformation.
Similar to Chile in 1973, the FSLN took control of the army “to protect the revolution from an
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the military.”191 It must be noted here that this act was
viewed suspiciously, for
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Sandinista domination of the postrevolution military, ostensibly to ensure the
implementation of the goal of socioeconomic transformation to benefit the poor,
was to be continually criticized by many outside the FSLN on the grounds that
one political party’s control over the armed forces interfered with the realization
of the fully democratic political system also promised by the revolution.192
To boost support for the revolution, the FSLN engaged in policies to increase literacy and
education, similar to the Cuban “literacy crusade,” and strengthened mass organizations such as
the AMNLAE, Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Association of Rural Workers, ATC),
and the Sandinista Youth-Nineteenth of July. However supportive these organizations were of
the revolution, they would nevertheless often disagree about policy with the FSLN.193 Despite
the occasional methodological disagreement, official support for these groups created a sense of
“political competency” among the people, eliminating the previous view that the wealthy
controlled all political influence.194 Community participation was essential to uniting the people
in a common purpose, which would later dictate the success of the healthcare system and
subsequently Nicaragua’s health status.
The Nicaraguan economy experienced growth from 1980 to 1983, but declined again in
1984. Although the decline can be attributed to similar problems in other Latin American
countries such as “declining terms of trade [and] a growing foreign debt,” it can also be
attributed to revolution-specific factors such as “the disruption of production caused by
nationalization and conflict between the private sector and the government.”195 With the help of
the United States under the Reagan Administration, opposition to the Sandinista government
developed into a significant counterrevolution into the contra war. The United States’ support
for the contras can be traced when understanding that the Somoza regime was “the most
192
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dependable ally of the United States in Latin America” and that the Sandinista government was
socialist in nature.196 In 1984, the contras became a formidable influence as the Fuerza
Democrática Nicaragüense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, FDN), led by many from the original
Somoza National Guard;197 this democratic initiative backed by “white propaganda” caused a
relapse into sociopolitical instability for Nicaragua yet again.
The counterrevolution was socially, politically, and economically detrimental to the
development of Nicaragua, for it undermined the revolution as (1) support for the FSLN waned
in light of a draft, (2) the physical and economic state of Nicaragua was further hampered, and
(3) resources were reallocated from social policies to the military.198 Much of the population
became displaced, “peasant cooperatives” became targets for the contras, and many peasants
were recruited by the army which resulted in a declining labor force. The counterrevolution
greatly affected the already declining economy, with food shortages and lack of private
investment, while U.S. sanctions only exacerbated these problems. Despite increased land
distribution, there was still opposition between the Sandinista government and the bourgeoisie;
the 1984 elections were the final break between these two.199 In short, the instability caused by
the contra war hindered progress in healthcare and impeded sociopolitical development in
Nicaragua.
Nicaraguan Healthcare
The pre-revolution health system in Nicaragua was controlled from the top, highly
fragmented, and was marked by high IMR, low nutrition levels, and preventable diseases such as
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diarrhea.200 The chaotic administration of the Instituto Nicaragüense de Seguridad Social
(Nicaraguan Social Security Institute, INSS) further demonstrated the inadequacy of the Somoza
healthcare system. Duplication, fragmentation, corruption, and personal involvement of
leadership shaped its inefficiency.201
Healthcare was inequitable, favoring the upper middle class in urban areas while only
28% of the population had “effective access to modern health service;”202 such disparity between
the rural and urban sectors for healthcare was more extreme in Nicaragua than in other Central
American countries, but relatively similar to Chile.203 Although the GINI index is largely
unavailable for Nicaragua before 1990, the disparity between the rural and urban areas can be
measured with area-specific IMR and percent of the population with access to piped water. The
percentage of Nicaragua’s population that was poor or very poor is also indicative at 62%.204
Table 4-1: Nicaragua: Estimated Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000), Urban and Rural205
1975

1979

1980

1985

1990

Rural

103

92

89

76

70

Urban

81

76

75

66

58

Difference

22

16

14

10

12

Table 4-2: “Nicaragua: Percent of population with access to piped water”206
1974

1979

1985

1987

Rural

6

6

11

15

Urban

72

63

76

76
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This combination of variables demonstrates the large gap of deaths caused by preventable
diseases and subsequently the difference in healthcare access for both groups. It can also be seen
that the gap in both IMR and access to water steadily narrowed, although the latter was at a
significantly slower pace.207
Unlike Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, somocista Nicaragua did not bother to
attempt improving these public health inequities.208 Quite the contrary; the National Guard
responded to insurrection by bombing health facilities and siphoning valuable resources that
would have otherwise maintained these buildings. Despite their elite social status, not all
physicians supported the Somoza regime. However, those who joined the opposition did not
escape the influence and repression of the Somoza government, particularly Oscar Danilo
Rosales and Alejandro Davila Bolanos; the former was murdered in an aerial napalm attack,
while the latter was arrested and tortured by the National Guard in 1978. Bolanos survived this
treatment and continued to work at the Esteli hospital to treat those injured by the Somoza, but
when the National Guard stormed the building during a later raid, they seized him and publicly
burned his body as a political statement.209 These types of insurrections following the
assassination of Chamorro “marked a period of brutal destruction of hospitals, raised the need for
curative and rehabilitative services for those wounded in the war, weakened the capacity of the
Somoza government to maintain even the inadequate services that existed, and inhibited small
reform initiatives.”210
Despite the disheartening obstacles for sociopolitical and economic transformations after
the revolution in 1979, Nicaraguan health did not take a drastic turn for the worse; in fact, it
207
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seemed to have improved.211 Bossert theoretically argues that a post-revolution regime would
strive to achieve a dedicated primary care approach because of their committed proclivity to
improve society; however, he does admit that some regimes would not devote the costly
resources toward greater public health if it does nothing to legitimize the regime. Regardless of
motivation, post-revolution Nicaragua attempted to restructure its healthcare system “in such a
way as to achieve equity, prevention, and participation within a relatively restricted budget.”212
The primary indication of such positive changes is clearly reflected in the consistent and
steep decline of IMR. One can see from Figure 4-2 and Table 4-3 that the steepest decline in
infant mortality began in the five-year period of 1975-1980, but stagnated in the next five-year
period of 1980-1985 due to the contra struggles. Despite the revolution and coup, or even in
spite of it, IMR declined with admirable speed. Even the period of 1970-1975 that lead up to the
revolution witnessed a more favorable decline. It must also be noted that these steep declines
occurred during an authoritarian polity, indicated in red.
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Figure 4-2: Nicaragua’s Infant Mortality Rate, per 1,000 live births213
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Table 4-3: Declining Trend of Nicaragua’s Infant Mortality Rate (in percentage)
Year
Percent
Decline

19601965

19651970

19701975

19751980

19801985

19851990

19901995

19952000

7.70

7.85

11.50

22.11

22.21

14.86

17.86

17.63

Nicaragua’s primary focus in the health system after the revolution was the right to
healthcare for all. Although there were inherent complications to such an ambitious goal, the
right to healthcare was a mentality that was soon spread, and the previously neglected population
finally received care.214 This mentality and awareness is crucial to maintaining good health
standing in any country, especially when considering a country like Chile in which a drastic
regime change occurred. The post-revolution Nicaraguan government attempted a pluralistic
public health system for all in favor of accessing rural areas, “emphasiz[ing] preventative health
213
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care, health education, and community participation.”215 Among the overall efforts to improve
the system, the three most noteworthy were creating national health organizations, launching
health campaigns and programs to improve health awareness and literacy, and quite significantly
“dealing with the issue of professional versus popular control of the health system and with
tensions between rural and urban areas.”216
Figure 4-3: Nicaragua: Percentage of population completed primary and secondary (age 15+)217
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Table 4-4: “Infant deaths per 1000 live births by mother’s education” in Nicaragua218
No School

Primary

Secondary

1966/67

136

108

57

1973/74

112

91

47

According to Figure 4-3, Nicaragua’s literacy rates changed little immediately before and
after the revolution; in fact, there is absolute stagnation across all figures during the period of
215
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1975-1980. During the period of 1980-1985, however, secondary education increased
dramatically (54.55%), particularly among women (86.36%), and it can be seen with Table 4-4
above that the application of these literacy rates is what truly changed with the revolution.
The organization of healthcare drastically differed from the Somoza period, morphing
into a three-tier system composed of hospitals, health centers, and health posts. The nationallyand foreign-run hospitals provided a wide breadth of care including long-term illnesses, while
each of the several regions established ten to twenty “health areas” that provided primary care;
health centers cared for more highly populated areas and offered more technical capabilities
whereas health posts were offered to lower populations and concerned common illnesses and
oral rehydration.219 A truly significant change that accompanied the reorganization, however,
was the assignment of trained staff to rural areas, which effectively reduced inequality
particularly within curative care.220 As seen in Table 4-5 below, the general number of
physicians and available hospitals beds improved dramatically during 1980-1985, with nearly
1,000 more doctors and 400 more hospital beds. Notice the reduction of hospitals after the
revolution, which (1) correlates well with either the focus on preventative rather than curative
healthcare, (2) indicates the level of destructions caused by Somoza’s National Guard raids, and
(3) indicates the replacement with community centers and health posts.
Table 4-5: Nicaragua: Additional Health figures221
1975

1979

1980

1985

1990

Doctors

911

1345

1212

2142

2417

Nurses

395

640

808

1152

1589

Beds in public hospitals

4115

4000

4677

5083

4720

Hospitals

34

34

31

31

30
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Community participation became the fundamental ingredient for a successful healthcare
system to rise from the revolution’s ashes, as the lack of participation in the 1970s was due to
low regime support.222 Widespread participation occurred after the revolution and the
establishment of the Sistema Nacional Unico de Salud (National Unified Health System, SNUS),
and demands and expectations from the masses grew rapidly as healthcare became an obtainable
reality.223 The period between 1979 and 1981 marked massive construction of health buildings,
most of which were constructed by the community rather than the government.224 Health
education was promoted with such initiatives as “public health days” and literacy campaigns, in
which community members were trained and spread the word in areas that would have been
otherwise inaccessible. Such direct participation in health reforms after the revolution was a
non-political method of involvement to rebuild the nation.225
Some authors note that despite the achievements of “equity, prevention, and
participation” within the national budget, the post-revolution health system still favored the
urban areas, emphasized curative care, and lacked skilled administration; all factors inhibited the
true commitment to prevention and equity.226 Although community participation in public health
picked up where the government health facilities left off during the 1979 revolution, this
participation was itself halted with the contra war and United States involvement.227 Indeed, in

222

Garfield and Williams, 35.
Richard Garfield, “Revolution and the Nicaraguan Health System,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 15 (May
1984): 69.
224
Garfield and Williams, 26.
225
Garfield and Williams, 36-42. It must be noted that these initiatives threatened conservatives and the status quo
of doctors’ middle class patients.
226
Bossert, “Health Care in Revolutionary Nicaragua,” 268-269.
227
Harvey Williams, “An Uncertain Prognosis: Some Factors That May Limit Future Progress in the Nicaragua
Health Care System,” Medical Anthropology Quarterly 15 (May 1984): 72.
223

64

1981, at the time the U.S. began funding the contras, the Reagan Administration stopped funding
for USAID-funded hospitals, and subsequently created significant delays.228
However, as can be seen with the above figures and tables, the healthcare system in
Nicaragua endured even with the complications of the contra war. “Public health campaigns
involving the general population have involved immunizations, improved sanitation, mosquito
control, and prophylactic antimalarial treatment,” which have been accomplished at an
“impressive” speed even during the contra attacks of 1983;229 although the contra war greatly
deterred participation when contra rebels began attacking civilians in 1983, the trained health
volunteers (brigadistas) were able to provide first aid to victims and prevent disease outbreaks
with vaccinations.230
Timeline
The following timeline plots relevant events in Nicaragua beginning from its
independence in 1838 and ending in 2000; it will also incorporate significant events relating to
health in addition to sociopolitical occurrences.231

Table 4-6: Nicaraguan Political and Medical Timeline

Independence
1838

Nicaragua becomes fully independent.

1893

General Jose Santos Zelaya, a Liberal, seizes power and establishes dictatorship.

1909

US troops help depose Zelaya.

1912-25

US establishes military bases.
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1915

Hookworm control program by the Rockefeller Foundation begins.

1922

Malaria control program begins.

1925

General Health Administration and “initial public health” are established.

1927-33

Guerrillas led by Augusto Cesar Sandino campaign against US military presence.

1930s

The United States’ help leads to the development of the Ministry of Health.

1934

Sandino assassinated on the orders of the National Guard commander, General Anastasio Somoza
Garcia.
Somoza dictatorship

1937

General Somoza elected president, heralding the start of a 44-year-long dictatorship by his family.

1956

General Somoza assassinated, but is succeeded as president by his son, Luis Somoza Debayle.

1958

Programs concerning national eradication of malaria are initiated.

1961

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) founded. The FSLN was originally led by Carlos Fonseca
Amador, Tomás Borge, and Silvio Mayorga, all of whom were from middle- and upper-class families
with the exception of Carlos Fonseca, the “prime mover.”

1967

Luis Somoza dies and is succeeded as president by his brother, Anastasio Somoza.

1972

Managua is devastated by an earthquake that kills between 5,000 and 10,000 people.

1974

December 27: Thirteen Sandinistas hold “politically prominent” hostages in response to Somoza’s
reelection.
Somoza declares martial law under the “state of siege.”

1976

Carlos Fonseca dies in combat against the National Guard.

1977

Somoza ends the “state of siege” due to negative publicity and the Carter administration,
unintentionally allowing the FSLN to organize more effectively.

1978

International aid began aiding the Sandinista cause, notably from Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and
Cuba.
January 10: Assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa and the leader of the
opposition Democratic Liberation Union.
August 22: FSLN seize the National Palace and hold over 1,500 people hostage.
September: Somoza reinstates the “state of siege” in response to the politically motivated fervor among
the youth because of August 22. More than 5,000 people were killed.
Sandinista Revolution (1979)

May 29

Sandinistas launch their “final offensive.”

June 20

ABC reporter Bill Stewart is murdered by the National Guard.

June 23

The Organization of American States (OAS) voted to demand Somoza’s resignation.

July 17

Somoza flees Nicaragua for Miami.

July 17-18

Somoza’s military (National Guard) disintegrates.

July 18

A provisional “government of national reconstruction” is established in the city of León. In their
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proclamation, they announce plans to form a “unified national health service.”
July 19

The Sandinistas and the Government of National Reconstruction takes control of Managua.

July 26

The first Cuban medical brigade arrives.

August 1

The newly appointed Minister of Health asks, via La Prensa newspaper, that hospital directors send
information on employees and their salaries. Health workers have not paid for three to six months.
The health ministry announces that vaccination campaigns will be started in a few days with the help
of equipment donated by the West German government.

August 2

The Interamerican Development Bank and the Organization of American States pledge, respectively,
$20 million and $500,000 in emergency food relief.

August 5

Headline in the new Barricada newspaper: “The Job in Health Will Be Gigantic!”

August 6

The health ministry announces that medical brigades have arrived from Mexico, Cuba, Germany,
Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Honduras.

August 10

The new Ministry of Health (MINSA) is inaugurated.

August 17

MINSA announcement in La Prensa: “The permits given to exhume cadavers of those fallen in the
insurrection are suspended immediately as a hygiene measure.”

August 20

The Government of Reconstruction proclaims that all INSS hospitals and clinics will be opened to the
public. Private rooms in public hospitals are similarly abolished.

August 27

The vice-minister of health announces: “Damage to the health system has been great, but we still don’t
know how great.” USAID announces a further increase in aid as 2,000 tons of food arrive.

August 31

Health is proclaimed to be a right of the entire population. It is announced that there will no longer be
a fee to fill prescriptions.
Post-revolution

1979-81

Massive construction of health buildings takes place, mostly by the community.

1980

Somoza assassinated in Paraguay; FSLN government led by Daniel Ortega nationalizes and turns into
cooperatives lands held by the Somoza family.
National Literacy Crusade begins.

1981

The Reagan Administration stops funding for USAID-funded hospitals.

1982

US-sponsored attacks by Contra rebels based in Honduras begin; state of emergency declared.

1983

Contra rebels attack civilians.
Concerning public health, maternal education takes priority.

1984

Daniel Ortega elected president; US mines Nicaraguan harbors and is condemned by the World Court
for doing so.
Healthcare gains political significance.

1987-88

Nicaraguan leadership signs peace agreement and subsequently holds talks with the contras; hurricane
leaves 180,000 people homeless.

1988

MINSA campaign begins to reduce infant mortality rates.
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October: Hurricane Joan-Mirriam results in significantly more deaths and damage than other Latin
American countries.
Post-Sandinista era
1990

US-backed centre-right National Opposition Union defeats FSLN in elections; Violeta Chamorro
becomes president.

1992

Earthquake renders 16,000 people homeless.

1996

Arnoldo Aleman elected president.

1998

Hurrican Mitch causes massive devastation. Some 3,000 people are killed and hundreds of thousands
are left homeless.

2000

FSLN win Managua municipal elections.

Chile
Pre-Revolution History
Unlike Nicaragua, Chile’s history is much more focused on economic conditions,
democratic traditions, and foreign influence. Thus, the historical context that addresses these
factors will create a better understanding of how the coup d’état in 1973 and Salvador Allende’s
dictatorship affected healthcare thereafter.
Spanish colonialism, British and French involvement, and American influence and
intervention all contributed to Chile’s economic dependence and maintained this situational
precedent throughout the twentieth century. Unlike other countries in which wars of
independence took place, Chile had a strong central authority and loyal armed forces; thus, the
class structure remained. After its independence in 1818, Chile’s export boomed especially
between 1845 and 1860-1875 with wheat and copper, resulting in increased urbanization and
power for the bourgeoisie. Liberal reforms began to take place in the 1850s in favor of
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decentralization and “democratic suffrage,” which were truly implemented when the
authoritarian state began to wane in power during the 1870s and 1880s.232
Chile’s dependent economy was created by Spanish colonialism, while uneven
competition and lessened demand in free trade resulted in socioeconomic crises. Reforms (and
even political restructuring) would be the original method to deal with these crises, but the
alternative that was pursued during the 1870s was to declare war on Bolivia and Peru and annex
the Atacama Desert in order to monopolize the nitrate supplies. Although foreigners would later
take over the nitrate mining, Chile’s monopoly expanded state expenditure, increased
urbanization, and created a substantial middle class. The market in nitrates dissolved after the
invention of synthetic nitrate in World War II, however, which collapsed Chile’s parliamentary
regime and increased middle class demand for reform. The military intervened from 1924 in
order to quell the demands, but only lasted until 1932.233
Chile’s industrial sector developed late, compounded with diminutive interest from the
bourgeoisie. Copper exports soon replaced those of nitrates, though American companies
controlled them in light of Chilean apathy toward nationalizing it. Although the period of 19241940 witnessed a return to national industry particularly under the dictatorship of Carlos Ibáñez
del Campo, it again fell along with his dictatorship in 1932. There was economic growth during
the 1930s and 1940s under the Popular Front governments, but copper prices fell in the early
1970s despite governmental efforts. It became clear at this point that Chile’s economy would
become dependent on foreign revenue.234
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Before its collapse in the early twentieth century, the nitrate economy created quite a
substantial working class. Even prior to the nitrate industry, Chilean miners have a historical
tendency dating back to 1834 to initiate uprisings and demonstrations, particularly when they
became more organized as time passed. During the 19th century, this working class was ruled by
the bourgeoisie and was barred from unionizing; indeed, “union organization was difficult and
often illegal; organizers were persecuted, and the army was regularly brought in to suppress
strikers.”235 Once established, however, Chile’s working class struggle for autonomy against the
bourgeoisie and their ideologies became more realistic.236
Revolution and Post-Revolution History
Since the workers in Chile “have a history of economic militancy and political struggle”
that began with the nitrate era, a working class (or proletariat Marxist) revolution seemed bound
to happen.237 It must be noted that although the ruling class partook in violent and repressive
tactics from the 1920s until 1973, there have also been more “political solutions” adopted by the
bourgeoisie aside from massacres and military intervention. Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie was
largely unified against potential threats and were able to make concessions to the working and
middle classes, albeit with repressive sentimentality. Their strategy was consistently “of a
reformist alternative to Communism, the promise of fundamental change without a real
revolution, coupled with periodic suppression of political parties or workers who would not
submit.”238 This strategy was strengthened by the division of the workers, a large middle class
whose beliefs tend to lie with the bourgeoisie than revolutionaries, and the promise that reformist
policies create state employment. Therefore, there was a choice in 1973 between revolution and
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restoration, “the outcome decided by a military coup with a violence and degree of bloodshed for
which there has been little precedence in Chilean history.”239
Eduardo Frei, a Christian Democrat, was elected in 1964 to reform Chile’s structures.
His progressive Revolution in Liberty reforms which differed from Marxism and thus gained
U.S. support would cost the landowners money and some of their socioeconomic power; thus,
the Christian Democrats were at odds with the “older and more established” national party.
Economic conditions continued to worsen in 1966-1967, with “inflation, stagnation, high
unemployment and underemployment, balance of payments crises and very unequal income
distribution and access to education, health and welfare.”240 Effective changes were mainly
concerned with the economic dependency of Chile and the “oligopolistic structure” of its
economy. The latter of the two was particularly problematic for Frei; there was a stunning
amount of land monopoly (1.3% of farmers owned 72.7% of the land) and a highly skewed
income distribution in the latifundio system that remained until 1970.241 His reforms
exacerbated the already “combative” nature of the working class, including that of the military
and the peasantry, resulting in numerous strikes throughout the 1960s and dramatically
increasing political mobilization. The Christian Democrats met these responses with more
repression as both the U.S. military and the grupo móvil, a police riot squad, became the force
for counterinsurgency and riot control.242
In the 1960s, the Left began to suspect that it would not gain power through electoral
votes. The Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (The Revolutionary Left Movement, MIR)
was created by socialist students as a split from the Socialist Party, and harbored a pessimistic
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viewpoint concerning the electoral path to power. The Unidad Popular (Popular Unity) coalition
was formed in 1969 as a multi-party government and policy advisor that would select a
candidate; it was diametrically opposed between the Socialist Party, Communist Party, and
Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (Popular Unitary Action Movement, MAPU) all of
which supported Salvador Allende against the Acción Popular Independiente (Independent
Popular Action Party, API), Partido Social Democracia de Chile (Social Democratic Party,
PSD), and Radical Party which supported Rafael Tarud. Allende, a Marxist, won the 1970
presidential election.243
Several authors agree that Salvador Allende’s “road to socialism” was not a peaceful
one.244 During his presidency, Chile witnessed “the gradual suppression of the opposition press
and an attempt to crush the bourgeoisie economically, while at the same time favoring the
working groups which supported him.”245 Thus, the “national conditions” that characterized the
government under Allende in 1970-1973 were a strong working class, a bourgeois democracy,
and a dependent economy; Chile was industrial at this time, with 70% of the population
considered urbanized and with an entrenched bourgeoisie and democratic tradition unique to
developing countries. External economic changes in Chile reflect its dependent economy,
especially when a dictatorship arose in the 1920s because of the collapse of nitrate exports to
reconstruct the whole political sphere in order to accommodate this shift. The “national
frustration” felt in 1970 exemplified the fact that foreign interests took precedence over those of
the nation.246
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Allende’s transition to socialism created “transitional costs” which focused on the
nationalization of copper companies, a raise in minimum wage, land reform, and increased social
spending; by 1973, the nation’s deficit of 25% was compounded by international economic
pressures and inflation, resulting in more frequent strikes.247 These policies of nationalization
weakened Allende’s relations with the other governmental branches, and created favorable
conditions to carry out a coup d’état.
James Petras provides an interesting account of Frei’s naivety concerning the military’s
motivations and the role reversal that occurred leading up to the 1973 coup. Allende’s
government was attacked by both the Christian Democrats under Frei as well as the Chilean
military, for “Frei and his supporters sought means to prevent Allende from taking power, and to
undermine the economy to prevent his development policies from succeeding.”248 Frei’s original
intention, according to Petras, was to initiate economic disaster which would call for Allende’s
impeachment, while the Right would take over with a dictatorship. Frei wrongly believed that
the military’s role would be brief and that he would restore democracy after eliminating the
Leftist parties.249 After the coup, the military gave the factories, banks, and corporations to the
technocrats (hence becoming a bureaucratic-authoritarian government), directly controlled the
universities and the media, and put professionals and businessmen in charge of government
policy. Clearly, Frei underestimated the “military’s lack of vocation for political office.”250 Paul
M. Sweezy accounts for another source of ignorance and states that the Unidad Popular was not
prepared for the armed confrontation on September 11, 1973. He argues that the Unidad
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Popular did not push its advantage to entrench its political influence; it simply believed that the
military would not intervene despite suspicion of coup d’état plots, and was contented with the
economic successes soon after Allende’s presidential victory.251
The military junta exerted their influence by means of terror and obtained legitimacy with
international loans that further established their power; they entrenched their “political rulership”
by “physically exterminating the opposition, eliminating deliberative bodies, silencing critics,
intervening in the universities, and burning books.”252 They used Frei to obtain their power and
became more permanent with the help of economic resources from the U.S.253 General Augusto
Pinochet assumed commander of the military regime that was established in 1973, which
disrupted nearly half a century of democratic elections.
Healthcare
Pinochet’s military dictatorship was “one of the harshest in modern Latin American
history;”254 however, amidst massacres, arbitrary arrests, censored media, stifled expression,
declining GDP per capita, and growing poverty and income inequality, his regime continued the
trend of improving health status and maintaining a health budget in Chile. Focusing on
particular programs or targeting specific at-risk groups such as mothers or the indigent, his
regime made the most efficient use of public social service spending.255 “Chile underscores that
a country can make good progress at reducing infant mortality even when social spending
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absorbs a fairly small proportion of GDP” and by focusing on “inexpensive but well designed”
programs.256
Despite these successes, the reorganization of the healthcare system into several
subsystems in 1981 was ultimately detrimental, and may have created the stagnation of IMR
during period of 1983-1986.257 Another contributing factor to this could be the development of
the Instituciones de Salud Previsional (Institutes for the Provision of Health, ISAPREs), as they
“have been accused of pandering to the young, the healthy and the rich” while discriminating
against women and consuming the majority of healthcare funds for a small fraction of the
population. After the ISAPREs were established, much of the population gradually shifted from
the public Servicio Nacional de Salud (National Health Service, SNS) to private healthcare in
general.258
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Figure 4-4: Infant Mortality Rate, per 1,000 live births259
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Table 4-7: Declining Trend of Chile’s Infant Mortality Rate (in percentage)
Year
Percent
Decline

19601965

19651970

19701975

19751980

19801985

19851990

19901995

19952000

28.27

25.99

25.18

44.62

32.29

19.49

27.39

20.18

Although IMR had already begun to decline after 1960, its steepest decline was during
this period of militarism. This boast can largely be attributed to the “public provision of basic
health services to the poor,” as well as improving access to rural areas, both of which had
previously been lacking.260 As seen in Table 4-7 above, there is a 45% decline in the five-year
period of 1975-1980 alone, whereas the five-year periods between 1960 and 1975 witnessed a
consistent decline of about 25% each; a similar trend can be seen during the later years of
Pinochet’s regime (1980-1985), but still not quite as drastic.
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Figure 4-5: Chile: GDP per capita growth (annual percentage)261
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Figure 4-6: Chile: GINI Index of Income Inequality262
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McGuire attributes particular significance to the link between health status and income
inequality and states that “despite high income inequality, Chile from 1960 to 2005 did better
than most other developing countries at meeting the basic needs of the least advantaged sectors
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of the population.”263 It can be seen in the three figures above that while GDP per capita
significantly plummeted in 1975, IMR was amidst its sharpest decline. Additionally, income
inequality (although there is a lack of data from 1975) seen an overall rise from 1970 to 1980.
Under Pinochet, Chile focused on literacy and education enrollment, potable water,
improved sanitation methods, and family planning especially the formation of the APROFA that
reduced abortion rates and decreased fertility rates since 1962. “If there is a lesson to be learned
from the military government’s health care policies, it is not to privatize health insurance, but
rather to improve the quality and accessibility of publicly funded primary care.”264 The evidence
strongly suggests that increased education (particularly among women) in spite of low GDP and
high income inequality can improve the health status of a country. This, of course, is not to
discredit or eliminate the implementation of social service programs.
Figure 4-7: Chile: Percentage of population completed primary and secondary (age 15+)265
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McGuire calls the counterintuitive juxtaposition of military dictatorship and improved
health as the “Pinochet Paradox,” but the situation is not unlike that of Nicaragua. Like
Nicaragua, Chile found that such factors as discussed above directly influence IMR. Particularly
influential is the shift of focus from hospitals to community centers, as seen during Allende’s
rule, which decreased IMR from 82% to 66%.266 Although this met with antagonism from
white-collar workers and private physicians that eventually contributed to his overthrow, it set
the tone for the continuance of health programs and initiatives throughout the military regime.
When determining the coup’s influence on healthcare, it is important to note that Chile
already maintained a progressive healthcare system prior to the revolution and coup, and that the
population had already recognized their right to proper health.267 Additionally, McGuire argues
that authoritarian states like Pinochet’s Chile tend to adopt a paternalistic quality that
consequently improves healthcare by prioritizing the needs of mothers and children.268 The
health situation seemed not to have been significantly affected by the coup; however, the coup
did indeed halt some of the APROFA’s efforts and led to the disappearance and imprisonment of
physicians and faculty members of medical schools. Despite these tragic setbacks, fertility and
maternal mortality continued to decline and the employment of nurses, midwives, and
nutritionists increased.269 As with Nicaragua, the juxtaposition between a repressive regime with
an accompanying coup and the continued improvement of health status is indeed
counterintuitive.
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Timeline
Similar to the Nicaraguan timeline, Chile’s timeline begins with its independence in 1818
and ends in 2000. Again, it will incorporate health-related and sociopolitical occurrences.270

Table 4-8: Chilean Political and Medical Timeline
Independence
1818

February 12: Chile becomes independent with O’Higgins as supreme leader.

1823-30

O’Higgins forced to resign; civil war between liberal federalists and conservative centralists ends with
conservative victory.

1835

February 20: Concepcion is destroyed by an earthquake.

1839

January 20: Confederation of Peru and Bolivia is defeated at the Battle of Yungay.

1851-61

President Manuel Montt liberalizes constitution and reduces privileges of landowners and church.

1879-84

Chile increases its territory by one third after it defeats Peru and Bolivia in War of the Pacific.

Late 19

th

Pacification of Araucanians paves way for European immigration; large-scale mining of nitrate and
copper begins.

1891

Civil war over constitutional dispute between president and congress ends in congressional victory,
with president reduced to figurehead.

1904

October 20: The War of the Pacific ends with a treaty between Bolivia and Chile.

1907

3,000 miners and their families were massacred by national troops after demonstrating in Iquinque.

1925

New constitution increases presidential powers and separates church and state.

1927

General Carlos Ibanez del Campo seizes power and establishes dictatorship.

1938-46

Communists, Socialists and Radicals form Popular Front coalition and introduce economic policies
based on US New Deal.

1939

January 24: Over 28,000 people perished in a 8.3 earthquake in Chillan, Chile.

1948-58

Communist Party banned.

1952

General Carlos Ibanez elected president with promise to strengthen law and order.
The Chilean National Health Service (SNS) is established.

1964

Eduardo Frei Montalva, Christian Democrat, elected president and introduces cautious social reforms,
but fails to curb inflation.

1967

October: President Johnson named Edward M. Korry to serve as the U.S. ambassador to Chile. Korry
served until 1971 and was kept ignorant by the Nixon administration of plans for a coup.
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Marxists take power and nationalize.
Pinochet Dictatorship
1970

September 4: Salvador Allende becomes world’s first democratically elected Marxist president and
embarks on an extensive program of nationalization and radical social reform.
September 11: Henry Kissinger discusses a “covert action program” to oust Allende.
September 15: President Nixon authorizes a U.S.-backed coup in Chile (failed attempt).
December 31: President Allende nationalizes the Chilean coal mines.

1971

December 1: Students begin a 2-day demonstration in Santiago against Allende’s government. The
government responds by banning student demonstrations and declared a state of emergency.

1973

July 13: A strike begins, involving more than a million workers demanding Allende’s resignation; the
strike lasts until the coup.
September 11: General Augusto Pinochet ousts Allende in CIA-sponsored coup and proceeds to
establish a brutal dictatorship.
September 21: 300 students were killed at a technical university when they announced they would not
surrender to the military (based on a report made declassified in 1999).
October 17: Winston Cabello Bravo, Allende’s chief economic planner where copper mines were to
become nationalized, was fatally shot among other political prisoners.

1974

A military intelligence agency is created, known for committing numerous human rights abuses.
June 27: Pinochet declares himself “Supreme Chief of the Nation.”
December 11: Pinochet takes the title of president of the republic.

1980

October 21: Pinochet issues a constitution that allows him to remain in power until 1988.

1981

May 1: Social Security becomes privatized.

1983

Pinochet reacts to protests with strong repression.

1985

February 5: the U.S. halts a loan to Chile in protest over human right abuses.

1988

Pinochet loses a referendum on whether he should remain in power.

1989-90

Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin wins presidential election; General Pinochet steps down in 1990 as
head of state but remains commander-in-chief of the army.

1990

Inflation hits 26%.

1994-95

Eduardo Frei succeeds Aylwin as president and begins to reduce the military’s influence in government.
Pinochet’s Aftermath

1998

General Pinochet retires from the army and is made senator for life but is arrested in the UK at the
request of Spain on murder charges.
August 19: Chile’s senate approved a bill to abolish the national holiday marking the 1973 coup
against President Allende. A Unity day was proclaimed instead to begin in 1999.

2000

March: British Home Secretary Jack Straw decides that General Pinochet is not fit to be extradited.
General Pinochet returns to Chile.
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Socialist Ricardo Lagos is elected president.
2000+

Chilean courts strip General Pinochet of his immunity from prosecution several times, but attempts to
make him stand trial for alleged human rights offences fail, with judges usually citing concerns over
the general’s health.

Comparative Remarks
Nicaragua’s “modernizing authoritarian regime” under Somoza drained state resources,
which created a strain on the societal balance and slowly eroded both the legitimacy of state
authority and the loyalty of the elite;271 a neopatrimonial state arose. As Johnson indicated, a
“conjunction” of occurrences such as inflation, nationalism, and increased corruption exacerbate
the cause for revolution. Nicaragua’s revolution in 1979 witnessed a significant change in its
societal and class structure and can thus be considered a social revolution as defined by
Sanderson’s criteria, albeit loosely when aligned with the theories of Johnson and Brinton. “The
originality of the Nicaraguan revolution was that, for the first time in Latin America, it joined
rural guerrilla warfare, urban insurrection, general strikes, political work among peasants and
workers, and the support of important sectors of the bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the
church.”272 According to Sederberg’s criteria (see Tables 1-1 and 1-2), Nicaragua witnessed a
significant reorganization of its class structure by means of coercion, and became a
semidemocratic state (according to the classification of Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán).
Chile dramatically changed from a democratic polity to a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the
opposite of Nicaragua, yet it also witnessed a conjunction of occurrences; however, its history
was complicated with democratic electoral competition and a higher emphasis on economic
dependency.273 Moreover, Polity IV accounts for factionalism in Chile from 1945 until the
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revolution in 1973, despite its democratic polity, and factionalism in Nicaragua from 1979-1983
and 1985-2007.274 Although this factionalism may dramatically impact the political
circumstances in each country, giving rise to or as a result of a revolution, it is again apparent
that the health status was largely unaffected; this is particularly true for Nicaragua.
The two main hypotheses that connect public health and political science, is the (1)
“wealthier is healthier” approach that emphasizes “economic output and purchasing power,” and
the (2) “social service provision” that emphasizes government programs and basic healthcare.
Each hypothesis has a different implication for policy-making, as the former would focus on
economic growth acceleration while the latter would focus on “basic social services to the
poor.”275 While purchasing power is not always feasible, providing social services is less
expensive and realistic. McGuire argues that “public provision of basic social services does
better than income-related indicators at explaining the pattern and pace of infant mortality
decline,” particularly for Chile.276 This also applies quite well to Nicaragua due to the
implementation of similar inexpensive programs.
Both Nicaragua and Chile shared the implementation of socialism (for which they lost
U.S. support), a large disparity between the urban and rural populations, and the prioritization of
healthcare.277 They both demonstrated success in health through improved community
participation, education, literacy, preventative health, political awareness among the population
(which increased expectations about the right to health), and access to rural areas. For Chile in
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particular, “long-term democratic experience changes citizen expectations.”278 Also, in light of
low (Nicaragua) or decreasing (Chile) GDP, both countries managed to decrease IMR and
increase LE. Crude death rates provide additional insight into the effect that the revolution and
coup had on health status. Similar in pattern to LE, the crude death rate did not increase rapidly
but rather continued to decrease in spite of the event. It can be seen with Nicaragua that it did
not continue at the same pace as prior to the revolution, but it still declined nevertheless.
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Figure 4-8: Nicaragua: Life Expectancy279
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Figure 4-9: Chile: Life Expectancy280
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Figure 4-10: Nicaragua: Crude Death Rate, per 1,000281
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Figure 4-11: Chile: Crude Death Rate, per 1,000282
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V. Conclusions
This study examined whether revolutions and/or coups d’état influence the adoption of
healthcare policies and subsequently the health status of the country in which the revolution took
place. It was hypothesized that a revolution, especially one that is accompanied by a coup d’état,
would have a negative impact on healthcare. This was not the case in Nicaragua and Chile,
albeit quite counterintuitively.
Six factors influence the effect on health, including (1) revolution type, (2) coup d’état
type, (3) regime type and change, (4) prior existence and permanence of healthcare policies, (5)
population expectation of their right to health, and (6) economic standing.
The classification of both revolution and coup d’état has an impact, albeit minimally, on
healthcare. Although the revolutions of both Nicaragua and Chile can be deemed actual
“revolutions” according to the more inclusive definitions, they yet cannot compare to the “grand”
or “total” revolutions of centuries past; indeed, the level of violence and destruction is far less
than that of the French or Chinese Revolutions. The accompanying coups d’état in Nicaragua
and Chile can also be considered “coups,” as the chief executive of the country was indeed
ousted and replaced; however, both were in the category of an autogolpe (self-coup), a
resignation of the leader, which is itself less violent than an assassination or total decimation of
the leadership. An autogolpe can achieve what it needs politically without the excessive
violence, and thus does not affect the health system beyond repair.
A more significant factor is regime change, since the government and public health are
inherently interrelated. It is not necessarily the actual revolution or coup that affects the postrevolution healthcare infrastructure, but rather the new regime and the policies it sets to
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establish.283 Both Nicaragua and Chile have demonstrated that regime change, be it democratic
to authoritarian or authoritarian to semi-democracy, positively affected health despite their
governmental differences; the main difference between democracy or semi-democracy and
traditional authoritarian or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes concerning health should be
insignificant.
Furthermore, Chile already upheld a lower infant mortality rate (IMR) with a steeper
decline around the regime change (Chile had a 44% decline around the revolution compared to
Nicaragua’s 22%), lower crude death rate, higher GDP, higher life expectancy (LE), and a higher
percentage of the population with primary and secondary education (see Figures listed in Section
IV) than Nicaragua; these numbers even continued to exceed those of Nicaragua’s in the postrevolution regime, despite its authoritative typology. Economic standing is also an insufficient
explanation for such health successes. Although the “wealthier is healthier” hypothesis is
certainly valid, it is not the case with Nicaragua and Chile. In both cases, IMR continued to
decrease and LE continued to increase despite a revolution, coup, declining GDP, increasing
income inequality, and a repressive authoritarian government.
The evidence presented in this study indicates: (1) the implementation of inexpensive
government programs (the “social services provision” hypothesis as indicated by McGuire) that
target at-risk populations, the poor, and the rural sector are most effective at improving the health
status of a country during economic slumps; (2) the regime prior to the revolution can have a
significant influence on healthcare, especially if the pre-revolution regime is a democracy with
extant high expectations of the population as seen with Chile (this can extend to the postrevolution regime as well, as with Nicaragua, in which the population gradually attained these
expectations); (3) the permanence of primary healthcare systems before the revolution can
283
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withstand economic fluctuation that is accompanied or even caused by a revolution and coup
d’état. The revolution and coup, as seen with both Nicaragua and Chile, at most created
temporary stagnation of health status for one to three years. It is the prioritization of costefficient and target-specific healthcare policies, in spite of or even initiated by revolution and
regime change, which continued to improve the health status of each country. Instability and
ideology in a regime alone do not create an adoption of healthcare policies; weak and unstable
regimes cannot successfully centralize or integrate healthcare policies, particularly if they depend
on foreign aid.
It must be noted that the additional factors of culture or religion not included in this study
may influence health status. The Church’s “political demands for human rights,
democratization, and social justice,” could have had a significant impact on public health, as well
as its ban on disseminating the dangers of sexually transmitted diseases.284 A possible positive
influence (apart from culture or religion) could be the invention of the “safer” synthetic vaccine
which can withstand warmer temperatures for longer hours and eliminate the risk of the
vaccine’s reversion to an infectious form; this invention is able to withstand the conditions of
healthcare centers in remote rural areas, thus improving the health status for that population.285
Cuba would have been an insightful addition to this comparative study; Horn states that
like Chile and Nicaragua, Cuba has made healthcare a priority and thus dramatically improved
the health status of the country. It would be interesting to see how Cuba, a country that had
minimal fluctuation in polity and also maintained a socialist state, achieved such high standards
and results in the health arena.
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